Showing posts with label Aristotle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Aristotle. Show all posts

7.01.2008

Order/Disorder Part 1: Limit

In a two part series to finish my exploration of the Greek body of text called Order/Disorder that I introduced in my last post, I discuss in two entries the basis of the moral code derived from a belief in a cosmic order, and the cultural production that resulted as adherence to that morality began to wane. Here, I build on the idea that order and logic provided the basis for Greek cultural and intellectual production throughout much of the Classical age, and suggest that this corresponds with the spread of Pythagoreanism.

The process of understanding Pythagoras has made the dynamic Greek civilization more understandable to me, especially as I’ve placed analyses by guys like Snell in a more informed historical context (It’s been very hard to find a discussion of Greek intellectual and cultural history that actually discussed sources). The Greek myths best known from the works attributed to the bard Homer had existed for centuries by the time Pythagoras appears in text in the early 6th century BCE, and a comparison of the two paradigms that the two aforementioned thinkers represent reveals the way in which thinking could open up, allowing for new perspectives of the self, the soul, and the nature of the physical world. The ancient Greek mythology that we all know and love relied on a set of assumption with only a very loose understanding of the body and what animates it, and believed in a pantheon of gods with all the caprices and brutality of human beings. Fate unfolds without any design, the threads of space knit together by the blind almost by chance, and as the tapestry forms across time, gods and men act and react within the physical world we can perceive with the senses. Kosmos (order), on the other hand, has purpose. The world operates according to a larger system—objects in space are units that operate as part of the whole, each with a value defined by an overarching structure. It gives man a new power—the ability to know and predict. It also gives him a personal space and individual choice (the source of the concept for the soul, be it material or immaterial).

Pythagoras gets credit for being the first transmitter of this kind of thinking, which would have far reaching effects on the Greek body of text that unfolded over the centuries following his life. Certainly Pythagoras was not the first to suggest some greater order to the universe—not only had he received an education in Egyptian and Babylonian traditions, he also continued the ancient Greek tradition attributed to Orpheus and his cult and before that, Dionysus. However, the rise of Pythagoreanism (at present ignoring his possible sources), corresponds to the rise of a different way of thinking—the growth of the cult of Apollo (which ceases to see him, and the muses which follow him, as very human-like creatures—anthropomorphic—and more like the ideal being and keeper of the order and of its revelation), and the burgeoning prevalence in text of references to the self and the individual mystical experience, that ecstatic moment of awe and wonder at the world and one’s place in it.

The nitty-gritty of Pythagoreanism revolves around number—but not as we would think of it; certainly, it’s almost violent to consider putting as much faith as they in what the contemporary mainstream would consider coincidence. Pythagoreanism itself took me quite a while to wrap my head around, and I had to research a great deal (thank you to Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier’s excellent book Measuring Heaven for its analysis of the growth of the Pythagorean school and its impact on art from the Classical period through the Middle Ages). I even visited New York City just for the day to attend a philosophy chat to which I was invited at Logos Bookstore on the Upper East Side just to ask the publishers who were sponsoring it some questions about Pythagoras’s number theory and ethics.

Fundamentally, it requires a different concept of numbers altogether, one not of magnitude (like how many apples are in a barrel, times 8 barrels, etc.), but of limit and definition—points in the infinite which, when seen as a series, provide structure for and make sense of the vast indefinite. The analogy of the monochord pulled it together for me—like on a guitar, where one can push the string an infinite number of places to create a new tone, one must have a sense of proportion with the original string’s length to really develop a system of tones based on ratio. Although the units one would choose to make those ratios (3/4, 8/9), etc., may seem arbitrary in an absolute sense, when utilized consistently in a defined system it makes a perfectly logical operating system. Thus, number does not have value in and of itself, but only relative to other points in the system, regardless of whether that system is constrained on a line, on a surface, in space, and in time.

I know it seems kind of nutty, but its actually wildly fun to figure out and really throw yourself into—no longer seeing just components, but the entire system and its intended operation. The Pythagoreans believed that the existence of ratios at all was not the order itself, but simply evidence, a reflection, of the larger system and design to all planes of existence (there are myriad approaches to the questions that this perspective allows relative to the end point of this whole system, the place of the individual within it, and so on. Please see my Plato post for just a couple of these responses by the thinkers known as the Pre-Socratics and by Plato himself). And so much Greek cultural and intellectual production reflects this assumption…statues that take into account the entire human form in order to create the image of an ideal man; temples where every angle and span work together in order to create a structure that inspires a sense of awe and majesty; an oral argument that makes the listener dive into his very beliefs and come away from the speech thinking differently about himself and his society; a social structure whose sole purpose is the just, and the good, and the right.

All these examples I list, though, hinge on a the creator’s commitment to a fundamental concept, and as I consider them it seems very clear to me how (certainly not why...that I'll explore later) the Greek text began to fall away from this manner of seeing artistic production into a world of disorder and confusion, as Greek civilization did by the early 3rd century BCE. The fundamental concept to which I refer is harmonia: the idea that the producer created a form of true beauty through its logical consistency, through its application of components whose value derived from a central rubric centered on the purpose of the form. Furthermore that the very purpose of creating the form was to coincide, or harmonize, with the greater order of existence. That is a question of morality—a commitment to the grand design by creating a system whose purpose worked toward that design’s intent. Thus it’s not a casting off of logic—certainly not—but a hazy idea of why one should use that logic at all. And that’s a matter of faith and personal purpose (I would suggest that the whole thing requires an initial inductive leap, but that’s because I’m an immoral person). As the Greeks discovered the power of a logical system, be it in music or oratory or art, many began to utilize it for their own personal gain instead of a moral code based on a concept of the universal order (see my post on rhetoric to read my own exploration of the philosophical problems caused by the work of the sophists, and a discussion of dialectic argument as a part of that inquiry). By the time Alexander rolls around in Greece, the body of text that we’ve inherited reflects a slowdown (although certainly not an end) to inquiry into the nature of order, and a greater priority given to functional knowledge created for the sake of application (See Euclid and Archimedes), without a coinciding discussion of the merit of the creator’s intent and the endpoint he or she pursues.

And so we see the philosophical discussion pushed to the edges in the new world of disorder. There, the schools and tribes of marginalized peoples who carried on the mystical traditions of the past would give birth to Stoicism, Skepticism, and of course, Christianity. Although Christianity will have to wait until the Italian peninsula and Rome, next post I’ll discuss Hellenistic literature, art, and other philosophical movements as I explore culture in a world of disorder.

5.27.2008

I Know My Limits (though they will change).

What does inquiry seek to accomplish besides to provide the predictability and comprehensibility necessary for control?

In my vision of the Western text, Aristotle’s work forms a turning point. Drawing from a series of philosophers and an oral tradition which wondered at the nature and value of existence and knowledge and survival, Aristotle moves to systematize the thinking that makes survival possible, and establishes the ordering principles of the physical plane, its constituent matter, and its forces for the purposes of enquiry. Aristotle declares which knowledge is valuable—he translates data into applicability and function, and creates a system of thought wherein one can produce more knowledge using replicability, comparison, and classification.



Systems of thought—so brilliant a purpose, a whole domain of forces and elements, potential causes and effects; and choosing to utilize, like tools, words and phrases, people, poetic devices, based on predictable results and with intent.

Aristotle’s vision for the order of the physical world relies on a supposition of an objective rubric. Therein lies the domain of all possible variable characteristics of any thing. It’s the source of value, in a mathematical manner of speaking, independent of sensed experience. All things comprise a series of characteristics—the set of which makes their defining form. The world can be known by filling in the blanks.

The logical order exists in this plane, and a sense of the mystical is absent in Aristotle. All things go toward their form, but perfection exists in a physical sense, and can be grasped by reason. It’s all very brass tacks. Thinkers like Plato and Parmenides, in contrast, utilized a philosophical system in a different sphere, influential of the physical but irreplicable here, and almost irreconcilable with data about the physical world perceived by the senses. Aristotle solves that problem.

To live in a city and utilize reason is to be human—in a city, one does more than just survive; sustenance taken care of, he engages and is political, and he uses all those parts of his thinking capacity to fully live as human, as is his form. Like all things in the physical world, human individuals are valued by external standards. They have a place, a function in society, based on their value and contribution to it. For this they are naturally suited. One works toward her or his full capacity, and that is moral. Each is more or less able to understand the order, utilize reason, and be more or less fully human. Thus we have a rationale for slavery and Greek domination. Enter stigma, racism, and social stratification with the veneer of objective value and thus normalcy and legitimacy.

Too bad for this turning point—the definition of knowledge set, enquiry filled in blanks and sophistic wondering and introspection about the knowable slowed. No more creativity in philosophy? Cold science ever after? And deductive logic needs assumptions—classification simplifies and limits, and requires an initial inductive leap—perception begins it whether you wish it or not. To deny this step, the first, denies sources. And again, enter legitimacy.

Aristotle’s is a knowledge of control. The father of control, like Herodotus was the father of history. His is a knowledge of predictability, application, function. It’s the opportunity for technology, and comparative study. It separates man from his sensed world by his capacity for reason—and he dominates his space and others. The system of knowledge facilitates, encourages control It’s the goal, and the endpoint.

Right now I had to write it like this. I embrace my limits as opportunities for growth.

2.17.2008

Rhetoric, at long last

It seems that as a result of becoming distracted with deeper research and some much needed interior design work at my coffeehouse, I’ve taken much the same road with Plato and prose/non-verse writing as I did with tragedy and poetics. So much for smaller posts every week. In both cases, the extra work I have done has proven fundamental to a really rich, inclusive knowledge of the subject at hand (Plato and philosophical writing in Athens). I got plenty on Plato so far, believe you me…but that’s for another day. Here I’ll stick to rhetoric and prose as a form of speech and text that falls under the heading of discourse art, as Plato and Isocrates (not to be confused with Plato’s famous teacher, Socrates) would have thought about it. I start with the conflict between sophistry and philosophy, which took me down this road in the first place, and I’ll dig deeper into the finer points from there.

I begin in a way new to these posts, with a lengthy quote from a book on rhetoric and poetics that I’ve found invaluable, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity by Jeffrey Walker. Here, Professor Walker discusses the then novel prevalence of teaching purely pragmatic persuasion in Athens relative to the method by which oratory and writing had been perceived and taught before:
“To take a modern (if somewhat inexact) analogy for what was happening, it is as if the entire enterprise of the discipline of “English” were to become identified almost exclusively with the teaching of business and technical writing[…]while the teaching of business and technical writing represents a small fraction of the total curriculum of English and can be seen as a (relatively) recent extension of English from its traditional concern with mainly epideictic/”literary” kinds of discourse into more pragmatic kinds, it is also true that teaching business and technical writing draws an enormous clientele and is often by far the most popular (or in-demand) thing an English department does. It is not unusual for the number of students enrolled in business and technical writing courses to rival or exceed the number enrolled in all of an English department’s “literary” offerings put together—even if business and technical writing represent only a sliver of that deparment’s curriculum. The demand for such courses is spurred by the fact that large numbers of students see them (quite correctly) as being relevant to their future careers and thus directly relevant to their personal well-being—just as the Athenian citizen of the early fourth century B.C. could see training in rhetoreia as directly relevant to his and his family’s personal well-being, and even to his physical survival.

“To continue this analogy, imagine that people were to begin thinking of “English” simply as training in business and technical writing, and imagine that there had begun to appear departments of “English” that taught virtually nothing but such courses. Imagine further that people had begun referring to “English” not as English” but as (perhaps) “business writing,” or “practical writing,” or simply as “writing” or, to use the most common (though wildly inadequate) cover term now in use, as “composition.” And then imagine that this term shift were to be appropriated by an extremely influential philosopher—or a university president—and that, in the long run, it were to stick. All this imagining would make the analogy reasonably complete. For that is approximately what happens in Plato’s invocation of, and in his famous attack on, the name and notion of an ‘art of rhetoric,’ techne rhetorrike, and in Aristotle’s subsequent effort to recuperate techne rhetorike as a philosophically respectable discipline.” (Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pgs. 33-34.)

I chose this passage because I think it analogized well the development of prose writing and speaking and shows an important distinction between two forms of speech that Walker identifies according to a very Greek paradigm—epideiktikon and pragmatikon. And I think it was this distinction, and the description of prose styles out of the Greek poetic tradition (which Walker notes was largely disregarded by classical scholars until recently, a contention with which I agree after having read three books on rhetoric before I came to Walker) that not only brought rhetoric and prose together for me, but has provided such an indispensable education in Plato without which I don’t think I would’ve ever gotten a good grasp on the guy. But more on him later. Back to epideiktikon and pragmatikon.

In many oral traditions, one must distinguish between speech and oratory according to its audience—in purely pragmatic speech, one seeks to make a case to those who will judge, or those who must make a decision based on facts and argument. This speech is largely spontaneous, and it is not meant to be recorded, or even remembered. It is purely functional language. Epideikitokon, on the other hand, explores an idea—it inspires to action based on more deeply held beliefs and even seeks to explore these beliefs. It can praise and blame. But in a larger sense, if one is to take all of poetics as a form of epideiktikon, in strictly Homeric terms it sways the psyche from its original sense, persuaded or inspired to a new manner of thinking (early writing referred to this a as a form of witchcraft). Taken in this context, many components of a text contribute to its inspirational capacity—the idea, yes, but also the rhythm, whether or not it has a melody and if so, the scale, or “mode” (series of tones distinguished relatively according to a pre-determined interval between one another), the form of verse (iambic, elegiac, dactylic, etc.), and so on and so forth. Example: a song in a minor key makes you sad…why? Or certain verse forms associate best with lust and love, or prayer, or comedy…why? I suppose that’s a question for the neurophysicists out there…is it a learned association? Or does the brain naturally respond to certain tonal orders, which evoke a feeling in your brain, so that you immediately become festive, or introspective, or awed. I don’t know the answers to these questions. What I do know is that the Greeks had “figured out” these associations, and mastery in poetics, and subsequently in that which was to become known as the art of rhetoric (non-metered oratory, the “art of speaking well), relied on a mastery of utilizing the components available according to the orator’s purpose.

Ah, the purpose; the idea, my son…the truest pursuit, ideas. In order to fully grapple with ideas, we do not only utilize our capacity to think, but learn “how to think,” how to take full advantage or our reason. We’ve all gone to school, we’ve all had those friends who have challenged us by asking really weird questions. Many of us went to college, where, as it is commonly held after it’s all done, that one “learns how to learn.” Additionally, traveling abroad or meeting people from other cultures challenge us to look at things differently and with a new perspective. And as we grow older, as we meet more people and have a variety of new experiences, we acquire a mental dexterity used to approach really tough ideas…what is important to me? Is there a god or an afterlife? How should I treat other people, and on what terms should I expect other people to treat me? What is love? What is good or right behavior? Who should I vote for, if I vote at all, and why? These are ideas, the tough stuff, and the real inquiry that becomes both easier and harder the more we learn.

Well, my friends, in a surprise move (should obviously be taken as sarcasm) the Greeks had a system for this kind of inquiry too. It was called sophistry, or “the art of making wise” and cultivating the intellect. The ideas, the really tough issues and thoughts, were called logoi (singular: logos). The manner of pursuing these logoi was traditionally persuasion through oratory, and its purpose was to both participate in civic life by asking tough questions, like “how should our government operate?” or “what should be thought of as good and admirable behavior?”, but also just to think and live a moral and introspective life. I should add here that I am still talking about the domain of text classified as epideiktikon, in which most text of the oral tradition lies: poetics included. I find here that the old adage, which I paraphrase, that “poets lie” has a new resonance—whereas poetics and music seeks to contrive (or “persuade”) a feeling in the listener, this “new” kind of text, non-metered prose oratory, seeks to find that which is good and true, and inspire for the sake of finding the right course of action, the best behavior, the most functional or effective outcome.

And so with the “discovery” of this kind of thinking (and if I am to draw again on Bruno Snell, the real birth of the individual, a seemingly natural result to the Greeks’ centuries-long process of inquiry), came the rise of teachers in logon paideia, or “discourse education.” These were the original sophists. The most famed of these sophists included Isocrates and Gorgias, who sought primarily to educate in thinking, and secondarily to orate, as public speaking was in many ways a display of the speaker’s sophia, or capacity to reason. Teachers sought to prepare the higher echelons of Greek society for participation in public life (this participation was open to all in these upper echelons), and most of all to cultivate a capacity for eubolia, or “good judgment.” The journey toward oratorical mastery relied on a pursuit for the good and the just, a sense of which teachers sought to instill in their students.

Now to bring it back to the quote from the venerable Professor Walker, who teaches in my hometown of Austin, Texas (I should make my dad, also a sometime University of Texas employee, take him out to lunch), and distinguish further between pragmatikon and epideiktikon. As I noted, oratorical text cannot be confined only to demonstrative oratory seeking to argue a larger idea of the right and the true. A great deal of political movement and the judicial process occurs on a much more nuts and bolts process…that let’s make a deal (in the political arena), and he said/she said shit that makes up the body of evidence in a case brought against a person suspected of a crime. This is the realm of pragmatikon, or pragmatic speech. It does not dwell on that which is true, but on rational arguments that conform to what the listeners and participants have already agreed to be true. Said differently, it is a matter of audience…in the case of pragmatikon, one speaks to a group who must make a decision or a judgment based on facts and with a particular task in mind. While some upper echelon boys and men had an interest in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, many only pursued enough education in matters of oratory to be able to defend themselves in court (anyone could bring a case against anyone in Athens. Also, isn’t this why many people go to college or grad school now, for the functional purpose of getting a job?) Add to this the growing number of men who, finding that they possessed a natural gift for arguing a point or speaking publicly, who would bring false cases against the wealthy who they knew they could out-argue purely for the sake of financial gain for themselves. Thus a distinct interest in the purely “technical writing” that Walker notes was born, and the subsequent and deserved vitriol (see present-day-almost-universal opinions on trail lawyers and politicians…EXACTLY the same feeling, man) for those who only taught the pragmatic oratory, and those who used it for destructive and self-serving pursuits. The best teachers of the era, Plato and Isocrates, decried this development and encouraged oratory’s return to its roots in poetics and logoi.

I should note here the philosophical distinctions between Isocrates and Plato, who despite his anti-sophist associations in contemporary attitudes seems to me like something of a sophist himself according to the original usage of the term. The important points I’d like to note here is not only the expressed, documented respect these two seemed to have for one another (despite their disagreements), but the distinct philosophical points of view of the two, as well as their preferred form of pursuing truth. Isocrates gave us the old adage that “man is the measure of all things.” In this he meant that there was no real truth, at least one which can be comprehend and especially replicated and articulated by man. The only things to which our brain has access is logoi…the composite of all the logoi we have constitutes our own personal doxa, or set of opinions. But all this can be changed when the next new, better logos comes around with a persuasive enough argument to back it up. So all knowledge is largely transient, just a set of opinions that will likely change throughout our life. All we can do is our best to find the most expeditious logos for the problem at hand, which we decide on by debating one another utilizing the techniques of persuasion. Plato, on the other hand, absolutely believed in an absolute truth (see his theory of ideas) and its mathematical articulation (I’m working on a book about Pythagorean mathematical concepts, among other things, right now. I’ll include what I learn in the next post). He also believed as his teacher Socrates did, that instead of persuasion, dialectical discourse, the ability to work with one’s interlocutor in an argument or conversation, to wittle down the discussion to the real stuff of the argument, was superior to persuasive oratory as a manner of inquiry. On the whole, though, both men believed in the ability of teaching to convey the basis ethical behaviors and a sense of right, and both acted as real philosophers with their own moral commitments.

As for me, now that I’m closing up this massive post I can comment on my thoughts. Anyone who has read my past posts or discussed the matter with me knows that I’m in both the Isocrates and Plato camp when it comes to truth. This whole project seems somewhat based on an Isocratean idea—we are vessels, channelers, and transmitters of values. We are loci in vast networks, and constitute the construction of culture, and our doxa are the series of ideas to which we have been exposed in our life. On the other hand, I’m a real hold out that there is something individual in everyone. Whether or not that is an internal space in our brain, I’m doubtful…however I hold out hope that in my own process of deconstructing all those values and ideas that have been passed on to and inherited by me, I will find something that is truly mine. In this sense, I think I’m Platonic...this space is my connection to the eternal, by virtue of it being truly mine. The adventure continues on that idea.

I will close speaking of adventures in ideas. Lately it’s been the concept of virtue. I was educated as a real relativist, so I can’t help but wonder what (or whose) purpose certain assertions of “right” and “good” serve. I got to thinking about it today by a passing comment made by a composer for the Kronos quartet today on Weekend Edition. He notes that through music we can become better people (major paraphrase, humor me), which I find to bear very strong similarities with the Greek worldview. Based on the text I’ve become acquainted with, there seems to be a perspective that perceived beauty can be associated with virtue because of its adherence to more cosmologically derived proportions, orders, and other associations. And I think it all comes down to sources of values, be they externally inherited or good for the individual based on experience and learning. Not only do I think that this process of internalization is a part of socialization, i.e. taking as true that which society believes to be good, I am also beginning to see more and more the process by which the individual values him or herself. And that’s some deep shit, and a major part of why this project remains so personal to me. All the other writing I’ve done on this subject aside, one can’t help but tend toward a little introspection on the matter of how one values him or herself via societal beliefs on what makes a good person. In the end, I think this is something I’ll continue to explore, but with some boundaries drawn. Whereas we can very readily see what values are admired and thought to be good in a particular society, the sources are a little tougher (unless they’re deliberately constructed by certain societal transmitters for a particular purpose), and even more difficult to understand by asking “why?” My intent here is to explore why we order or compel at all, without relying on those terminological copouts of “human nature” or “power.” I think enough thinkers and writers and artists will appear in my future study that I will have ample opportunity to continue exploring these questions, however evasive and often speculative the answers may be. More adventures.

Next time, Plato’s Republic, the theory of ideas and the co-optation of Pythagorean mathematical and musical concepts into mainstream discourse. Believe it or not, all this will be unbelievably easier now that I’ve done this rhetoric jazz. I’m glad I took the time. I’ve included some text from Gorgias, Isocrates, and another famed Athenian orator, Demosthenes, on the list for good measure, and updated my additional source list to include Walker and Snell’s books. And boy howdy, am I ready to crack out Aristotle and Hellenistic Greece and get on to Rome and the early Christian church. I need a change. Soon…Thanks a bunch to Jeffrey Walker for his great book.