Showing posts with label Greece. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greece. Show all posts

9.04.2008

Order/Disorder Part 2: The Absence of Right

In the absence of right, loneliness and desperation reign. For when Right has dimmed, so too does mankind—inward looking for answers, he bellows into an empty space, spending his time breathing and avoiding hunger. He hopes to distill the echoes inside of his private chamber to only those of his own voice from the voices of those who, by their earthly wherewithal alone, have managed to shout into it as well. When right eludes, the institutions that dominate every relationship between human beings become like a God. However, they are not God—they are terrestrial, and thus temporary. Left with no purpose or manner of pursuing the good, a man has only his ability to breathe. He has his possessions, which will leave. He has his friends, who will die. And he has a world to inhabit that only seeks to inspire him to believe, that the way things are now are the way they should be. That this world is right. But it cannot be. And when it ends, another will replace it, with much the same method of convincing the man of his rightness. And so he is not righteous, but compliant. Not productive, but replicable and able to replicate. He does not progress, but instead just accepts.

The above describes both the Hellenistic world in which I live, as well as the transition into the Hellenistic period that Greece experienced after Alexander. Following the dominance of Macedonian Greeks Phillip II and Alexander the Great, the city state as a political form of any relevance died away. Nothing took its place, per se—instead, it was rendered impotent by the dynastic power centers that emerged when Alexander’s generals carved up the territory that he and his father had brought under their control. Although still in existence, true self-determination through democratic means withered. Subsequently, the feeling that men could work together to make the good come alive in their earthly lives fell away. The mood of the Hellenistic world was uncertain and unstable—kingdoms changed hands, new leaders emerged and fell, and the polis, constantly reconstituted, failed to provide any longer the backbone of society. Without that avenue by which one could build a world based on the Right, depression grew rampant. At least it does in me as I consider the end of the Greek world I’ve studied and the non-system that came to replace it. Prudence was pointless. The struggle for survival became top priority, and the individuals who, in former times, would have sent a message that resonated, faced marginalization in a world not interested in listening.

A man, although once possessing free will, learns to accept. Often by the time he grows to adulthood he has forgotten entirely that he had humanity at all. But the shouts in the private space now sound like his own voice, and he follows them, still believing himself to be self-propelled. A lucky few have maintained their capacity for discernment, though. The voices are torturous, to be sure, but clearly not from him. It’s a life of agony, and sometimes self-deceit. He lives a life not of searching, but of constantly re-finding, and, having replenished himself from the filtered faucet can see the right and move it forward, going along with it. But to pursue the right is not to serve an institution that serves itself.

Integrity is labeled egoism by those who believe the institution to be right, and forgetting one’s place. Best to relinquish humanity, and utilize the tools of reason and eros, not for their intended purpose, the pursuit of right, but to application for the sake of the institution, the dynasty, and for those whose fathers constructed it and must maintain it now. The creator still uses rhetoric and craftsmanship. However, he employs them for theatricality, to exercise power because he can, or to glorify himself or the powers which already are. Sensing their unimportance, they desperately seek to fabricate it and soothe their fluid non-selves.

Survival and “excellence” was available via relationships with the centers of power. As I noted in my post on rhetoric, the “discovery” of the power of rhetoric to people like Plato and Isocrates was a mixed bag, relative to other sophists of the period. Should these tools be used for personal gain? As a delivery system and a mechanism for control? Or should they be used to pursue the right and to make it happen in the world? The former seems to have won out…rhetoric, and the underlying idea of logos was co-opted by the power centers, and subjugated to the purely functional. Art was self-glorifying, and although people like Snell posit that this is a discovery of the self and the individual, I think it’s a distancing. It’s communicating a message for an intended purpose, and ultimately for a closed system…not for the sake of moving thought forward on a larger, and ultimately unknowable, trajectory. The same reason I find it repugnant in this period is the same reason I, and most for that matter, find marketing and advertising repulsive nowadays—it’s a pursuit with definite boundaries, and end which without even realizing it is to serve and support those who hold power and the institutions which support them.

The stability and the fantasy of order emerge, and enticing with force and coercion, reign beyond all else. Working to end change, to ensure stability, are mankind’s labors, and he works to dull and kill himself. In such a world, survival is not valuable.

Supporting those institutions is to deny that which is truly human, by closing off the potential of the human mind and the capacity it has for creative thought and the creation of the new. Why is it better to live than to die? As far as I’m concerned, existence for the sake of perpetuating existence is pointless and stupid. The purpose is temporary, and the pursuit will likely change tomorrow, and set itself up with the same trappings as the purpose before it.

But change persists, and despite the institution’s best efforts it crumbles. The elites, the sycophants of the top tiers have acquired their position through replication, not production. They’ve created a status that reinforces their place, favoring good taste over the Right and the good. But they have declared the taste they have defined to be good, and spend their days becoming experts in proclaiming its importance, and indexing and categorizing it for quick reference, easing transmission of their impotent preference, and thus their own importance.

Here, I had Callimachus the poet in mind. He was a librarian at Alexandria, and claimed to “hate all things common.” I’m back and forth with him…although I believe I know what he meant by saying that (in a sense, decrying the very type of pursuit and belief that I’ve been criticizing so far in this piece), his pursuit seems more for the purpose of doing it just because he can, and not because it was good or right. Then again, by making as almost a requirement the intense study of literature and words, and favoring concise and well structured poetry, perhaps he was in fact doing precisely that which I have trouble seeing during this period…rising above the muck, breaking through the traditional methods of communication and creating an unadorned message. But to save it just for the learned...there’s something I find repelling in that. What’s the point of making art, if it’s for art itself and not for the levels to which it can elevate human life, and make it all more liveable? The jury will have to stay out on Callimachus for now. As for the library at Alexandria, their primary achievement was the generation of cataloguing tools, without which many of the works now seen as the paragons of the Classical world would be lost to us. However, my point here is that replicating and reconstituting past work, saving it and storing it up, seems not only elitist, but uninspired. Better to rest on the laurels of the past?

When the structure that propped up the elites begins to bend and crack, they ensure their position in a newly constituted house by convincing the new owner of their use to him. That is if they haven’t died in the interim, for another, already forgotten kingdom.

I had Archimedes in mind here. Truly, one of the most gifted mathematical minds whose work is on record and noted. Many of his most noted achievements, though, were to benefit his sponsor, the king of Syracuse. The discovery of measuring volume through water displacement? Formulated in order to tell, through the calculation of density, if the king’s crown was truly made of gold. The Archimedes screw? Used to pump bilge water out of the king’s galleys, the largest ships the world had every seen. Granted, the mathematics that Archimedes formulated came remarkably close to the science that Newton would one day conceive of and which we now call calculus. And Archimedes considered his greatest achievement not the above mentioned engineering advances, but the proof that the surface area and volume of a cylinder were 2/3 that of a sphere of the same proportions. But what happened to Archimedes? In a moment of unbelievable symbolism, he was ignobly killed by a random Roman soldier when the king of Syracuse was conquered.

For those with little to offer, but resources to survive, the practice is different. They’re self-sufficient in that which supports them, and align with ease to each new wave with the power of their anonymity. They too, though, have relinquished their humanity, pursuing survival without questioning why it was crucial to survive at all. But having lost their free will, and not seeing an order in the world around them to which they can look, and believing themselves pushed and incapable of pushing, they look to the stars, or inside. Above what forces are taking me, and where do I go now? Who am I? And what role should I play? The questions are the same when the individual looks to his own feet, where he believes he must find a new method to accept, and learns to get along and stop steering entirely.

During the Hellenistic period, Sumerian astrology came into widespread practice. I think that the belief in astrology comes as a result of a psychological reaction to one’s circumstances in life or to the state of the world. It provides a comfort, a way to turn off and relinquish control and responsibility. As for the internal pursuit…well, I thought I’d be really into the philosophy of this era. The Cynics, the Stoics, the Epicureans…I though that kind of thinking would be very attractive and insightful. But it’s just kind of sad. It’s a practice of acceptance. Of getting along, and avoiding engagement in the world. Introspection is critical in human life, but this kind of introspection just reads, to me, like a big giving up. On the other hand, much of the Cynic philosophy was learning how to “distill”, as I mentioned above—defacing the coinage, as Zeno put it. Thus I think the philosophy of the period had a lot to offer, but didn’t really push anything forward. They suggested a way of life that would make existence tolerable, but without committing to any real meaning. Kind of like postmodernism…

In the absence of right, man is not man. He has sunk to the bottom of a stagnant lake, or drags across the sand and learns to appreciate it. He is complicit in this, and will remain so forever. He will rot and die, with only particles left, not ever sensing what his role could have been in building the tower to the sky, and contributing to the eternal motion of that which is good.

To serve the institution that reigns is to be the institution, not oneself. I haven’t even mentioned Menander and New Comedy…the first situational comedy. It’s all rags to riches stuff, fluff entertainment. No catharsis, only resolution to the story. I’ll miss tragedy. I wrote the un-italicized stuff first, and filled in with some facts and what I’ve been thinking with the italicized text. Thank you for humoring me on this—it hasn’t been a failure on my part per se, but I always work hard to internalize whatever I’m studying in the project, and it can come out in a billion different ways. Just look at the Aristotle post. Additionally, although I suggested that I’d write something big on the Greeks, I think I’m going to take on the whole ancient Mediterranean in that…at this point in Greek history where I leave off in this post, the Romans have already fought the Punic wars, and are about to really take off as an Empire, soon after the Hellenistic period ends (when the Cleopatra and the Ptolemaic dynasty, the last of the Alexandrian kingdoms, falls to Augustus). With so much overlap, it’s better to take it in all at once, and make room for the next revolution in thinking…early Christianity. Etruscans and Early Romans next time.

7.01.2008

Order/Disorder Part 1: Limit

In a two part series to finish my exploration of the Greek body of text called Order/Disorder that I introduced in my last post, I discuss in two entries the basis of the moral code derived from a belief in a cosmic order, and the cultural production that resulted as adherence to that morality began to wane. Here, I build on the idea that order and logic provided the basis for Greek cultural and intellectual production throughout much of the Classical age, and suggest that this corresponds with the spread of Pythagoreanism.

The process of understanding Pythagoras has made the dynamic Greek civilization more understandable to me, especially as I’ve placed analyses by guys like Snell in a more informed historical context (It’s been very hard to find a discussion of Greek intellectual and cultural history that actually discussed sources). The Greek myths best known from the works attributed to the bard Homer had existed for centuries by the time Pythagoras appears in text in the early 6th century BCE, and a comparison of the two paradigms that the two aforementioned thinkers represent reveals the way in which thinking could open up, allowing for new perspectives of the self, the soul, and the nature of the physical world. The ancient Greek mythology that we all know and love relied on a set of assumption with only a very loose understanding of the body and what animates it, and believed in a pantheon of gods with all the caprices and brutality of human beings. Fate unfolds without any design, the threads of space knit together by the blind almost by chance, and as the tapestry forms across time, gods and men act and react within the physical world we can perceive with the senses. Kosmos (order), on the other hand, has purpose. The world operates according to a larger system—objects in space are units that operate as part of the whole, each with a value defined by an overarching structure. It gives man a new power—the ability to know and predict. It also gives him a personal space and individual choice (the source of the concept for the soul, be it material or immaterial).

Pythagoras gets credit for being the first transmitter of this kind of thinking, which would have far reaching effects on the Greek body of text that unfolded over the centuries following his life. Certainly Pythagoras was not the first to suggest some greater order to the universe—not only had he received an education in Egyptian and Babylonian traditions, he also continued the ancient Greek tradition attributed to Orpheus and his cult and before that, Dionysus. However, the rise of Pythagoreanism (at present ignoring his possible sources), corresponds to the rise of a different way of thinking—the growth of the cult of Apollo (which ceases to see him, and the muses which follow him, as very human-like creatures—anthropomorphic—and more like the ideal being and keeper of the order and of its revelation), and the burgeoning prevalence in text of references to the self and the individual mystical experience, that ecstatic moment of awe and wonder at the world and one’s place in it.

The nitty-gritty of Pythagoreanism revolves around number—but not as we would think of it; certainly, it’s almost violent to consider putting as much faith as they in what the contemporary mainstream would consider coincidence. Pythagoreanism itself took me quite a while to wrap my head around, and I had to research a great deal (thank you to Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier’s excellent book Measuring Heaven for its analysis of the growth of the Pythagorean school and its impact on art from the Classical period through the Middle Ages). I even visited New York City just for the day to attend a philosophy chat to which I was invited at Logos Bookstore on the Upper East Side just to ask the publishers who were sponsoring it some questions about Pythagoras’s number theory and ethics.

Fundamentally, it requires a different concept of numbers altogether, one not of magnitude (like how many apples are in a barrel, times 8 barrels, etc.), but of limit and definition—points in the infinite which, when seen as a series, provide structure for and make sense of the vast indefinite. The analogy of the monochord pulled it together for me—like on a guitar, where one can push the string an infinite number of places to create a new tone, one must have a sense of proportion with the original string’s length to really develop a system of tones based on ratio. Although the units one would choose to make those ratios (3/4, 8/9), etc., may seem arbitrary in an absolute sense, when utilized consistently in a defined system it makes a perfectly logical operating system. Thus, number does not have value in and of itself, but only relative to other points in the system, regardless of whether that system is constrained on a line, on a surface, in space, and in time.

I know it seems kind of nutty, but its actually wildly fun to figure out and really throw yourself into—no longer seeing just components, but the entire system and its intended operation. The Pythagoreans believed that the existence of ratios at all was not the order itself, but simply evidence, a reflection, of the larger system and design to all planes of existence (there are myriad approaches to the questions that this perspective allows relative to the end point of this whole system, the place of the individual within it, and so on. Please see my Plato post for just a couple of these responses by the thinkers known as the Pre-Socratics and by Plato himself). And so much Greek cultural and intellectual production reflects this assumption…statues that take into account the entire human form in order to create the image of an ideal man; temples where every angle and span work together in order to create a structure that inspires a sense of awe and majesty; an oral argument that makes the listener dive into his very beliefs and come away from the speech thinking differently about himself and his society; a social structure whose sole purpose is the just, and the good, and the right.

All these examples I list, though, hinge on a the creator’s commitment to a fundamental concept, and as I consider them it seems very clear to me how (certainly not why...that I'll explore later) the Greek text began to fall away from this manner of seeing artistic production into a world of disorder and confusion, as Greek civilization did by the early 3rd century BCE. The fundamental concept to which I refer is harmonia: the idea that the producer created a form of true beauty through its logical consistency, through its application of components whose value derived from a central rubric centered on the purpose of the form. Furthermore that the very purpose of creating the form was to coincide, or harmonize, with the greater order of existence. That is a question of morality—a commitment to the grand design by creating a system whose purpose worked toward that design’s intent. Thus it’s not a casting off of logic—certainly not—but a hazy idea of why one should use that logic at all. And that’s a matter of faith and personal purpose (I would suggest that the whole thing requires an initial inductive leap, but that’s because I’m an immoral person). As the Greeks discovered the power of a logical system, be it in music or oratory or art, many began to utilize it for their own personal gain instead of a moral code based on a concept of the universal order (see my post on rhetoric to read my own exploration of the philosophical problems caused by the work of the sophists, and a discussion of dialectic argument as a part of that inquiry). By the time Alexander rolls around in Greece, the body of text that we’ve inherited reflects a slowdown (although certainly not an end) to inquiry into the nature of order, and a greater priority given to functional knowledge created for the sake of application (See Euclid and Archimedes), without a coinciding discussion of the merit of the creator’s intent and the endpoint he or she pursues.

And so we see the philosophical discussion pushed to the edges in the new world of disorder. There, the schools and tribes of marginalized peoples who carried on the mystical traditions of the past would give birth to Stoicism, Skepticism, and of course, Christianity. Although Christianity will have to wait until the Italian peninsula and Rome, next post I’ll discuss Hellenistic literature, art, and other philosophical movements as I explore culture in a world of disorder.

6.28.2008

Introduction to Order/Disorder

It’s becoming difficult to focus my thinking as I approach a point where I’ll map the network I created over the last year and analyze it in a larger piece which I hope will bring everything together. So in an attempt to tie loose ends I will write two more posts, both entitled Order/Disorder. The first will discuss the rise and importance of order in Greek text, the influence of Pythagoreanism in the arts, and the larger themes of math and music. The second will address philosophical movements like the Cynics and Epicureans and literary moments like New Comedy as confidence in a fundamental system wanes in the most prevalent texts from the later centuries of Greek Antiquity.

5.27.2008

I Know My Limits (though they will change).

What does inquiry seek to accomplish besides to provide the predictability and comprehensibility necessary for control?

In my vision of the Western text, Aristotle’s work forms a turning point. Drawing from a series of philosophers and an oral tradition which wondered at the nature and value of existence and knowledge and survival, Aristotle moves to systematize the thinking that makes survival possible, and establishes the ordering principles of the physical plane, its constituent matter, and its forces for the purposes of enquiry. Aristotle declares which knowledge is valuable—he translates data into applicability and function, and creates a system of thought wherein one can produce more knowledge using replicability, comparison, and classification.



Systems of thought—so brilliant a purpose, a whole domain of forces and elements, potential causes and effects; and choosing to utilize, like tools, words and phrases, people, poetic devices, based on predictable results and with intent.

Aristotle’s vision for the order of the physical world relies on a supposition of an objective rubric. Therein lies the domain of all possible variable characteristics of any thing. It’s the source of value, in a mathematical manner of speaking, independent of sensed experience. All things comprise a series of characteristics—the set of which makes their defining form. The world can be known by filling in the blanks.

The logical order exists in this plane, and a sense of the mystical is absent in Aristotle. All things go toward their form, but perfection exists in a physical sense, and can be grasped by reason. It’s all very brass tacks. Thinkers like Plato and Parmenides, in contrast, utilized a philosophical system in a different sphere, influential of the physical but irreplicable here, and almost irreconcilable with data about the physical world perceived by the senses. Aristotle solves that problem.

To live in a city and utilize reason is to be human—in a city, one does more than just survive; sustenance taken care of, he engages and is political, and he uses all those parts of his thinking capacity to fully live as human, as is his form. Like all things in the physical world, human individuals are valued by external standards. They have a place, a function in society, based on their value and contribution to it. For this they are naturally suited. One works toward her or his full capacity, and that is moral. Each is more or less able to understand the order, utilize reason, and be more or less fully human. Thus we have a rationale for slavery and Greek domination. Enter stigma, racism, and social stratification with the veneer of objective value and thus normalcy and legitimacy.

Too bad for this turning point—the definition of knowledge set, enquiry filled in blanks and sophistic wondering and introspection about the knowable slowed. No more creativity in philosophy? Cold science ever after? And deductive logic needs assumptions—classification simplifies and limits, and requires an initial inductive leap—perception begins it whether you wish it or not. To deny this step, the first, denies sources. And again, enter legitimacy.

Aristotle’s is a knowledge of control. The father of control, like Herodotus was the father of history. His is a knowledge of predictability, application, function. It’s the opportunity for technology, and comparative study. It separates man from his sensed world by his capacity for reason—and he dominates his space and others. The system of knowledge facilitates, encourages control It’s the goal, and the endpoint.

Right now I had to write it like this. I embrace my limits as opportunities for growth.

5.02.2008

Herodotus in the New Yorker

The lastest edition of The New Yorker features a piece by Daniel Mendelsohn discussing the Landmark Herodotus.  I've written on Herodotus, and already written briefly on this new edition of Herodotus's Histories when its editor, Robert Strassler, appeared on Tom Ashbrooke's On Point.

I had heard about this piece from Christina, one of my few commenters, an avid New Yorker reader.  But I must say I was underwhelmed.  It all felt so...uninspired; the writer, a classicist himself, treats the material with the distance of quaintness.  The whole thing just seems like a brief nod, a "oh yes, of course, old Herodotus"...a snicker and a wink, and passing acknowledgments of the broader political and contemporary issues that the history sheds light on.  These reflections, though, stuck to cliche crap, and any comments on the actual edition seemed thrown in out of obligation.

The article gave me pause for a little introspection, though, and I should both admit and explore that here.  I just read John Berger's Ways of Seeing, and I think that's made a perspective of which I've always embraced resonate a little more: namely, that to acknowledge a work like Herodotus's as important, at least important enough to release a new edition of it, illustrates the power structures that still operate within the Western consciousness.  As Berger points out, cultural texts, and more relevantly the Eurocentric practice inherited from the Renaissance of valuing Classical artistic production, for centuries reinforced authority's dominance and the values which kept it in the supreme position.  And although one part of me thinks that I play into this, that to laugh off Herodotus as kitsche does not afford some appropriate respect to Herodotus (hence my introspection), I think my distaste for attitude Mendelsohn exhibits goes deeper.  He notes at the beginning of his piece that Thucydides always spoke to his generation of classicists a little more, and to drop the History of the Peloponnesian War in conversations regarding contemporary politics of two decades ago was to show one's acumen in Realpolitik.  Herodotus seemed to lack that applicability.  But to apply the values of these texts at all seems flawed to me.  I would have preferred a discussion of how Herodotus influenced centuries of thinkers and ideas, placing Herodotus within a time, and assigning him importance, and noting why this text is important enough to be re-released, because he was important to many thinkers that many still look to for answers (And I should note here that I don't quite know the motivation of the editor of Landmark to rerelease it). Instead, Mendelsohn giggles like a dinner part attendee at the quality of the writing, the tangents, etc., because they don't measure up to contemporary standards.  Well, no shit.  I'm glad that he's spending his time now on writing about the present through a comfortably firm (and comfortably institutional) paradigm, because I think he displays a real lack of how to value the past: deconstructing how he thinks now.

2.17.2008

Rhetoric, at long last

It seems that as a result of becoming distracted with deeper research and some much needed interior design work at my coffeehouse, I’ve taken much the same road with Plato and prose/non-verse writing as I did with tragedy and poetics. So much for smaller posts every week. In both cases, the extra work I have done has proven fundamental to a really rich, inclusive knowledge of the subject at hand (Plato and philosophical writing in Athens). I got plenty on Plato so far, believe you me…but that’s for another day. Here I’ll stick to rhetoric and prose as a form of speech and text that falls under the heading of discourse art, as Plato and Isocrates (not to be confused with Plato’s famous teacher, Socrates) would have thought about it. I start with the conflict between sophistry and philosophy, which took me down this road in the first place, and I’ll dig deeper into the finer points from there.

I begin in a way new to these posts, with a lengthy quote from a book on rhetoric and poetics that I’ve found invaluable, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity by Jeffrey Walker. Here, Professor Walker discusses the then novel prevalence of teaching purely pragmatic persuasion in Athens relative to the method by which oratory and writing had been perceived and taught before:
“To take a modern (if somewhat inexact) analogy for what was happening, it is as if the entire enterprise of the discipline of “English” were to become identified almost exclusively with the teaching of business and technical writing[…]while the teaching of business and technical writing represents a small fraction of the total curriculum of English and can be seen as a (relatively) recent extension of English from its traditional concern with mainly epideictic/”literary” kinds of discourse into more pragmatic kinds, it is also true that teaching business and technical writing draws an enormous clientele and is often by far the most popular (or in-demand) thing an English department does. It is not unusual for the number of students enrolled in business and technical writing courses to rival or exceed the number enrolled in all of an English department’s “literary” offerings put together—even if business and technical writing represent only a sliver of that deparment’s curriculum. The demand for such courses is spurred by the fact that large numbers of students see them (quite correctly) as being relevant to their future careers and thus directly relevant to their personal well-being—just as the Athenian citizen of the early fourth century B.C. could see training in rhetoreia as directly relevant to his and his family’s personal well-being, and even to his physical survival.

“To continue this analogy, imagine that people were to begin thinking of “English” simply as training in business and technical writing, and imagine that there had begun to appear departments of “English” that taught virtually nothing but such courses. Imagine further that people had begun referring to “English” not as English” but as (perhaps) “business writing,” or “practical writing,” or simply as “writing” or, to use the most common (though wildly inadequate) cover term now in use, as “composition.” And then imagine that this term shift were to be appropriated by an extremely influential philosopher—or a university president—and that, in the long run, it were to stick. All this imagining would make the analogy reasonably complete. For that is approximately what happens in Plato’s invocation of, and in his famous attack on, the name and notion of an ‘art of rhetoric,’ techne rhetorrike, and in Aristotle’s subsequent effort to recuperate techne rhetorike as a philosophically respectable discipline.” (Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pgs. 33-34.)

I chose this passage because I think it analogized well the development of prose writing and speaking and shows an important distinction between two forms of speech that Walker identifies according to a very Greek paradigm—epideiktikon and pragmatikon. And I think it was this distinction, and the description of prose styles out of the Greek poetic tradition (which Walker notes was largely disregarded by classical scholars until recently, a contention with which I agree after having read three books on rhetoric before I came to Walker) that not only brought rhetoric and prose together for me, but has provided such an indispensable education in Plato without which I don’t think I would’ve ever gotten a good grasp on the guy. But more on him later. Back to epideiktikon and pragmatikon.

In many oral traditions, one must distinguish between speech and oratory according to its audience—in purely pragmatic speech, one seeks to make a case to those who will judge, or those who must make a decision based on facts and argument. This speech is largely spontaneous, and it is not meant to be recorded, or even remembered. It is purely functional language. Epideikitokon, on the other hand, explores an idea—it inspires to action based on more deeply held beliefs and even seeks to explore these beliefs. It can praise and blame. But in a larger sense, if one is to take all of poetics as a form of epideiktikon, in strictly Homeric terms it sways the psyche from its original sense, persuaded or inspired to a new manner of thinking (early writing referred to this a as a form of witchcraft). Taken in this context, many components of a text contribute to its inspirational capacity—the idea, yes, but also the rhythm, whether or not it has a melody and if so, the scale, or “mode” (series of tones distinguished relatively according to a pre-determined interval between one another), the form of verse (iambic, elegiac, dactylic, etc.), and so on and so forth. Example: a song in a minor key makes you sad…why? Or certain verse forms associate best with lust and love, or prayer, or comedy…why? I suppose that’s a question for the neurophysicists out there…is it a learned association? Or does the brain naturally respond to certain tonal orders, which evoke a feeling in your brain, so that you immediately become festive, or introspective, or awed. I don’t know the answers to these questions. What I do know is that the Greeks had “figured out” these associations, and mastery in poetics, and subsequently in that which was to become known as the art of rhetoric (non-metered oratory, the “art of speaking well), relied on a mastery of utilizing the components available according to the orator’s purpose.

Ah, the purpose; the idea, my son…the truest pursuit, ideas. In order to fully grapple with ideas, we do not only utilize our capacity to think, but learn “how to think,” how to take full advantage or our reason. We’ve all gone to school, we’ve all had those friends who have challenged us by asking really weird questions. Many of us went to college, where, as it is commonly held after it’s all done, that one “learns how to learn.” Additionally, traveling abroad or meeting people from other cultures challenge us to look at things differently and with a new perspective. And as we grow older, as we meet more people and have a variety of new experiences, we acquire a mental dexterity used to approach really tough ideas…what is important to me? Is there a god or an afterlife? How should I treat other people, and on what terms should I expect other people to treat me? What is love? What is good or right behavior? Who should I vote for, if I vote at all, and why? These are ideas, the tough stuff, and the real inquiry that becomes both easier and harder the more we learn.

Well, my friends, in a surprise move (should obviously be taken as sarcasm) the Greeks had a system for this kind of inquiry too. It was called sophistry, or “the art of making wise” and cultivating the intellect. The ideas, the really tough issues and thoughts, were called logoi (singular: logos). The manner of pursuing these logoi was traditionally persuasion through oratory, and its purpose was to both participate in civic life by asking tough questions, like “how should our government operate?” or “what should be thought of as good and admirable behavior?”, but also just to think and live a moral and introspective life. I should add here that I am still talking about the domain of text classified as epideiktikon, in which most text of the oral tradition lies: poetics included. I find here that the old adage, which I paraphrase, that “poets lie” has a new resonance—whereas poetics and music seeks to contrive (or “persuade”) a feeling in the listener, this “new” kind of text, non-metered prose oratory, seeks to find that which is good and true, and inspire for the sake of finding the right course of action, the best behavior, the most functional or effective outcome.

And so with the “discovery” of this kind of thinking (and if I am to draw again on Bruno Snell, the real birth of the individual, a seemingly natural result to the Greeks’ centuries-long process of inquiry), came the rise of teachers in logon paideia, or “discourse education.” These were the original sophists. The most famed of these sophists included Isocrates and Gorgias, who sought primarily to educate in thinking, and secondarily to orate, as public speaking was in many ways a display of the speaker’s sophia, or capacity to reason. Teachers sought to prepare the higher echelons of Greek society for participation in public life (this participation was open to all in these upper echelons), and most of all to cultivate a capacity for eubolia, or “good judgment.” The journey toward oratorical mastery relied on a pursuit for the good and the just, a sense of which teachers sought to instill in their students.

Now to bring it back to the quote from the venerable Professor Walker, who teaches in my hometown of Austin, Texas (I should make my dad, also a sometime University of Texas employee, take him out to lunch), and distinguish further between pragmatikon and epideiktikon. As I noted, oratorical text cannot be confined only to demonstrative oratory seeking to argue a larger idea of the right and the true. A great deal of political movement and the judicial process occurs on a much more nuts and bolts process…that let’s make a deal (in the political arena), and he said/she said shit that makes up the body of evidence in a case brought against a person suspected of a crime. This is the realm of pragmatikon, or pragmatic speech. It does not dwell on that which is true, but on rational arguments that conform to what the listeners and participants have already agreed to be true. Said differently, it is a matter of audience…in the case of pragmatikon, one speaks to a group who must make a decision or a judgment based on facts and with a particular task in mind. While some upper echelon boys and men had an interest in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, many only pursued enough education in matters of oratory to be able to defend themselves in court (anyone could bring a case against anyone in Athens. Also, isn’t this why many people go to college or grad school now, for the functional purpose of getting a job?) Add to this the growing number of men who, finding that they possessed a natural gift for arguing a point or speaking publicly, who would bring false cases against the wealthy who they knew they could out-argue purely for the sake of financial gain for themselves. Thus a distinct interest in the purely “technical writing” that Walker notes was born, and the subsequent and deserved vitriol (see present-day-almost-universal opinions on trail lawyers and politicians…EXACTLY the same feeling, man) for those who only taught the pragmatic oratory, and those who used it for destructive and self-serving pursuits. The best teachers of the era, Plato and Isocrates, decried this development and encouraged oratory’s return to its roots in poetics and logoi.

I should note here the philosophical distinctions between Isocrates and Plato, who despite his anti-sophist associations in contemporary attitudes seems to me like something of a sophist himself according to the original usage of the term. The important points I’d like to note here is not only the expressed, documented respect these two seemed to have for one another (despite their disagreements), but the distinct philosophical points of view of the two, as well as their preferred form of pursuing truth. Isocrates gave us the old adage that “man is the measure of all things.” In this he meant that there was no real truth, at least one which can be comprehend and especially replicated and articulated by man. The only things to which our brain has access is logoi…the composite of all the logoi we have constitutes our own personal doxa, or set of opinions. But all this can be changed when the next new, better logos comes around with a persuasive enough argument to back it up. So all knowledge is largely transient, just a set of opinions that will likely change throughout our life. All we can do is our best to find the most expeditious logos for the problem at hand, which we decide on by debating one another utilizing the techniques of persuasion. Plato, on the other hand, absolutely believed in an absolute truth (see his theory of ideas) and its mathematical articulation (I’m working on a book about Pythagorean mathematical concepts, among other things, right now. I’ll include what I learn in the next post). He also believed as his teacher Socrates did, that instead of persuasion, dialectical discourse, the ability to work with one’s interlocutor in an argument or conversation, to wittle down the discussion to the real stuff of the argument, was superior to persuasive oratory as a manner of inquiry. On the whole, though, both men believed in the ability of teaching to convey the basis ethical behaviors and a sense of right, and both acted as real philosophers with their own moral commitments.

As for me, now that I’m closing up this massive post I can comment on my thoughts. Anyone who has read my past posts or discussed the matter with me knows that I’m in both the Isocrates and Plato camp when it comes to truth. This whole project seems somewhat based on an Isocratean idea—we are vessels, channelers, and transmitters of values. We are loci in vast networks, and constitute the construction of culture, and our doxa are the series of ideas to which we have been exposed in our life. On the other hand, I’m a real hold out that there is something individual in everyone. Whether or not that is an internal space in our brain, I’m doubtful…however I hold out hope that in my own process of deconstructing all those values and ideas that have been passed on to and inherited by me, I will find something that is truly mine. In this sense, I think I’m Platonic...this space is my connection to the eternal, by virtue of it being truly mine. The adventure continues on that idea.

I will close speaking of adventures in ideas. Lately it’s been the concept of virtue. I was educated as a real relativist, so I can’t help but wonder what (or whose) purpose certain assertions of “right” and “good” serve. I got to thinking about it today by a passing comment made by a composer for the Kronos quartet today on Weekend Edition. He notes that through music we can become better people (major paraphrase, humor me), which I find to bear very strong similarities with the Greek worldview. Based on the text I’ve become acquainted with, there seems to be a perspective that perceived beauty can be associated with virtue because of its adherence to more cosmologically derived proportions, orders, and other associations. And I think it all comes down to sources of values, be they externally inherited or good for the individual based on experience and learning. Not only do I think that this process of internalization is a part of socialization, i.e. taking as true that which society believes to be good, I am also beginning to see more and more the process by which the individual values him or herself. And that’s some deep shit, and a major part of why this project remains so personal to me. All the other writing I’ve done on this subject aside, one can’t help but tend toward a little introspection on the matter of how one values him or herself via societal beliefs on what makes a good person. In the end, I think this is something I’ll continue to explore, but with some boundaries drawn. Whereas we can very readily see what values are admired and thought to be good in a particular society, the sources are a little tougher (unless they’re deliberately constructed by certain societal transmitters for a particular purpose), and even more difficult to understand by asking “why?” My intent here is to explore why we order or compel at all, without relying on those terminological copouts of “human nature” or “power.” I think enough thinkers and writers and artists will appear in my future study that I will have ample opportunity to continue exploring these questions, however evasive and often speculative the answers may be. More adventures.

Next time, Plato’s Republic, the theory of ideas and the co-optation of Pythagorean mathematical and musical concepts into mainstream discourse. Believe it or not, all this will be unbelievably easier now that I’ve done this rhetoric jazz. I’m glad I took the time. I’ve included some text from Gorgias, Isocrates, and another famed Athenian orator, Demosthenes, on the list for good measure, and updated my additional source list to include Walker and Snell’s books. And boy howdy, am I ready to crack out Aristotle and Hellenistic Greece and get on to Rome and the early Christian church. I need a change. Soon…Thanks a bunch to Jeffrey Walker for his great book.

2.03.2008

Herodotus on On Point

This week on NPR member station WBUR's nationally syndicated show On Point, host Tom Ashbrook interviewed Robert Strassler, editor of the recently released Landmark Herodotus, the followup to the Landmark Thucydides, which Strassler edited in 1996. Strassler has a largely amateur and mainstream point of view on Herodotus, but in general the conversation gives some great insights on Herodotus's Histories and the challenge of producing a new edition of this important work. Access the interview here.

1.24.2008

New Territory in Plato and Rhetoric

As I lay alone in my little apartment tonight, diving once again into the material I read ages ago on Plato but had not yet reached a point of writing about, I have so far only validated that which I had feared and complained about in my past posts regarding that clever little student of Socrates. I can state comfortably, though, that through my study until now I have constructed a sufficiently strong enough paradigm to understand Plato for his contribution, even if I do not understand the man’s philosophy fully. Plato was a revolution in thinking within Greek society. He blew it all into one great mess (mess the key word here). With the help of my friend and virtually sole commenter Trip, I have developed a pretty good idea of Plato’s place in everything I have developed so far, and that this place relies on a few basic tenets—Plato and Socrates are two different guys with two very distinct philosophical commitments, and that one must distinguish major portions of Plato’s work as challenges to the dominant paradigm, not a new paradigm per se.

This is not to suggest that Plato did not have his own philosophy, no sir…I suggest that Plato uses Socrates, and as far as we can tell the actual teachings of Socrates, as a vehicle of breaking down the mainstream trends in thinking that I have spent months describing in my posts. The logic of Socrates utilizes the tools of this dominant rationale to find its own holes, its own weaknesses that cannot be explained. In this void, the philosopher Plato injects a new philosophy, an alternative philosophy that seeks to answer the questions that the dominant paradigm cannot answer according to its own baseline assumptions. I can comfortably say that this distinguishes Socrates and Plato as I understand the two, and put simply and in somewhat modern terms, Socrates deconstructed the prevailing order and Plato suggests an alternative. Why? I think that Plato had a real grudge against the system that would condemn his teacher, Socrates, to death. Add to that the turbulence of the period following the Peloponnesian War, both in the major political impact it must have had and the new, Spartan sponsored government that ruled Athens after its defeat in the conflict. I think that Plato may have had a real protest streak inspiring him.

At this time, I am pleased with simply understanding this leap, which is to say that I can see a distinction between the character Socrates and the philosopher Plato. Understanding the philosophy of Plato remains elusive so far—it’s a real tough cookie, especially given that I choose not to read his primary sources yet, sticking instead to the histories of philosophy that construct his role in a trajectory in which he only played a part, albeit a major one. Socrates saw the limits, though, and the holes—Plato seeks to fill them. But this new philosophy of Plato’s must have a source as well, just like everyone else. The manner in which he injects the mainstream with new ideas highlights his career, but even his new ideas had to come from somewhere (namely Pythagoras, as I understand it so far). So in future posts I will not only grapple with the nature of Plato’s new and distinct philosophy, relative to the philosophical tradition on which I have dwelt for months, but the intellectual heritage, the sources really, that inspire Plato and that one can track to other intellectual traditions.

While studying Plato I’m going to take the opportunity to study some sideline topics that I find germane to the subject at hand and important to understand. Inspired by a regular customer and friend Mary Kay, I have taken on rhetoric for starters. At their roots, rhetoric and persuasive oratory are truly righteous—not only does oratory bring together many of the most fundamental and defining components of Greek society, namely the still resonant oral tradition and the use of logic, but it speaks to the real stuff of Greek values beyond the cosmological viewpoint I’ve taken until now, namely the role of the nation-state in daily life, the continued absence of writing from any central role in society, etc. I’ve found the element of the nation-state and polis especially intriguing—as the society in which one lived came to replace the individual in the whole Homeric “glory” paradigm about which I’ve written before, civic and political participation carried a certain religious weight to it in a form that I haven’t yet encountered. Sure, since the very beginning of society and government, leaders have made connections between their rule and the immortal beings that supposedly endorse it. But Athens presents a unique problem, in that its democratic society, based in the Homeric tradition of noble and memorable deeds as a pathway to immortality, seems somewhat detached from the older warrior-code ethic of dominance. Instead, ordinary Athenian citizens provided the primary impetus behind legal and political proceedings through reasoned speeches seeking to persuade listeners of their point. The art of developing these arguments came to be known as rhetoric, and several notable Athenians specialized in writing speeches, developing arguments, and understanding the components and the construction of an oratory for the sake of persuasion. However, like most things whose presence comes laced with values and morality, the perspective held by the public of rhetoric’s practitioners was complex, and varied according to orators’ motives and techniques.

Notable rhetoricians and orators included Gorgias, Demosthenes, and Isocrates. All three men made unique contributions to the craft of persuasion, ranging from biting political oratory (Demosthenes), components of the persuasive argument (Gorgias), and the underlying morality of the practice (Isocrates). None of these men, though, had much use for the word rhetoric, a term which had only recently achieved regular usage in reference to any specific technique or paradigm, and who all condemned the men known as sophists, although at least Gorgias and Isocrates remain somewhat associated with the profession of sophistry from the viewpoint of many contemporary observers. The class of men known as sophists traveled about and taught rich young men the craft of utilizing wordplay and a variety of oratorical devices not only to persuade, but to win an argument. This is an important distinction, as it gave rise to what I perceive as a real scummy lot of folks out there who used these tools not as a means to justice or civic virtue, but for personal gain. One sees some of this conflict in Thucydides. Some of those who made a substantial amount of money in endeavors such as these seem to me to have had much the same reputation in Athens as malpractice or personal injury trial lawyers have now—mincing words, creating false arguments, and bringing into the public forum suits which did not serve the community at all, instead filling the purses of those who targeted the wealthy for their own fiduciary benefit.

So I have a better sense now of the complexity of rhetoric’s use in Athenian society, and am beginning to understand to a greater degree the concept of civic virtue. I bear this in mind as I begin to really go deep in that old protester Plato, who seems to rebel against the more hollow components of that civil society, positing not something necessarily new, but something rooted in a distinct sense of the individual. The sense of the eternal which Plato suggests has the potential for a resounding impact in future thinking, and I’m excited to really dig deep into he whom I believe to be the first writer I study that truly sparks a revolution in thinking. Add this to my continued consideration of the role of the polis in the thinking of the individual Athenian. Next time, more rhetoric and a further treatment of the actual definition and roots of Plato’s philosophical commitment.

12.30.2007

The Ancient Historians, Part 1

Despite a busy few weeks, I’ve begun my study of the ancient historians by formulating a concept of history’s meaning and role in Greek society’s intellectual production. I’ve done this in an attempt to understand historical texts as a literary form, and I have developed an idea of history related to its derivation from the word “inquiry.” This will provide the basis for a helpful paradigm in my closer examination of the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon in the coming couple of weeks.
I have defined history as the inquiry into a system comprised of subjects and objects related to one another through interaction and/or association. The narrator and analyst of this system, the historian, identifies relevant actors and assigns relative importance to them, and details aspects of the system such as its origins, the nature of the dynamics between actors, and the definition and impact of forces within the system that effect change.
This definition takes into account elements of historical inquiry during the period I currently study such as the role of the historian and his perspective, and I have kept it broad enough to encompass disciplines we now consider distinct form the practice of history, (the natural sciences, economics, politics, ethnography, etc.) as the Greeks would have. By conceiving of history in this way, I break down my own long standing idea of history as simply a narrative of past events, and better place myself within the Greek worldview. Especially, given that history had its own muse, thus placing it among those disciplines that function to reveal and recreate the underlying order, I can now imagine inquiry as a more creative process. Perhaps the process of writing history is an inquiry into the order’s manifestation in human society and the physical world. Perhaps one could even intend to reveal a more universal truth, or order to things, by inquiring into a single series of events.
At present I think that future research into the historians I’ve chosen to study will reveal not only insights into the last points of the preceding paragraph, but will help me to understand further the concept of glory (the must of history, Clio, was called “the glorious one”), which I first encountered while learning about Homer. I suspect also that I may find some clues on how human behavior, and political organization, as well as the understanding of those events deemed important at the time, fit into the greater order. I think history’s job may be to deal with those issues.
In the near future I’ll be looking more closely at Herodotus, and more specifically at what compelled him to include such a detailed ethnography in his inquiry into the Persian Wars and his characterization of those conflicts as East v. West. I believe my study of Thucydides will reveal a good deal more about the “glory theme,” and perhaps even some insights that I may find useful as I continue into Plato and the emergence of an idea of the eternal in Greek society. The more political aspects of Thucydides excite me most of all...I’ve had a theory recently that political action within an institutional context reflects the purpose and actions of the entire organization. Which is to say, we internalize the institution’s values and make them our own. In this sense, structure becomes like another actor in any political history.
I’m considering new ways to learn about the development of science and math in the West, and I’m toying around with some ideas for a new project. The new one would be a lot more hands on, as I explore the technology and engineering in tandem with the mathematical and scientific advancements. Maybe I’ll finally learn a thing or two about astronomy. Until the next time.