Showing posts with label History. Show all posts
Showing posts with label History. Show all posts

1.02.2009

Cato, History, and the Illusion of Conservativism

I often think of Cato these days when considering the Romans.  Now that I too have lost pretty much of all hope in achieving the ideal that I once thought meant something, I think I can sympathize with him a little bit.  Cato was a Roman senator, tough as nails apparently and a “real Roman”.  Perhaps the most salient reason that I think about him lately is the motif he seems to represent.  Horribly distrustful of the growing influence of Greek culture on Roman society, Cato called for a return to true Roman values.  He believed they’d been disintegrating as a result of laziness and frivolity among the Roman upper classes.  He blamed, among other things, the introduction of Greek thinking, carried on the back of Greek art, music, and philosophy, to Roman society

I note this because it seems that as the Romans approach the age of Augustus, the literature and poetry of Rome communicates a growing conflict that reflects Cato’s complaint.  This is so at least among those lyricists and writers receiving the patronage (or disapproval) of Augustus and his chief arts liaison, Maecenas, and from a broader perspective among the political and societal programs of Augustus himself.  By legislating and promoting certain societal values, Rome’s first emperor Augustus sought to recreate Rome according to an image, real or not, of time centuries before.  This was the Rome of the Punic Wars, wherein Rome defeated the Carthaginians to the west (mid-third to mid-second centuries BC); the Macedonian Wars, fought at the same time as the Punic Wars and consequently knocking out every single Alexandrian kingdom to the east (with the exception of Egypt, which would fall under Roman control with the death of Cleopatra and the battle of Actium in 32 B.C.), and decimated the Gauls led by Vercingetorix to the north (this was Julius Caesar’s great achievement, called the Gallic Wars).

To be frank, I couldn’t care less about military history—tactics and generals, and so on and so forth.  That stuff's for geeks and old men.  My interest in these battles is understanding the heroes of Rome, and seeing the process by which Rome came to dominate the Mediterranean basin and what is now southern Europe and the Iberian peninsula.  Furthermore, I wonder—how did a pseudo-democratic society manage such an expansion, and what tools did they use to effectively impose Roman control on regions so far away from the metropolis?  Most critical to my study of these times is to see how cultural production reflects the societal dynamics put in motion by these events, and what kind of cultural identity resulted from them.  Militaristic, certainly…but not just savage.  This was a military controlled by the senate, a body whose norms and rules had been established over centuries.  Rome’s successes—the glory of Rome, as it were—came to form the legend that would provide a basis for Roman patriotism, a critical component of Roman identity (given how dispersed Rome’s empire became, ethnic identity seems only a vague contributor to culture.  Pedigree, however, is a different story.  See my last post).  The system that enabled these achievements, and the values that system socialized into those under its purview, would be just as critical to the identity, then, as the successes themselves.

Hence Cato’s complaint.  As Rome becomes richer and more powerful, absorbing other cultures into its fold, the Greek civilization becomes one of the most popular societies of the past that Roman upper classes emulate.  Art pieces are imported and copied constantly, and there’s a renewed interest in the writing, music, and philosophy of Rome’s Mediterranean neighbors.  As noted in my last post, Rome did not just become Greek culturally.  They took Greece and its products.  The underlying dynamic of that process is one of the most characteristic components of Roman culture.  And Cato hated it.  He thought that Rome was losing sight of those values that had made them great, values that essentially made emulating Greece possible in the first place.  Furthermore, he blamed a loss of patriotism for the greed that propelled the great Roman civil war forward that led to the rise and fall of Julius Caesar.  He wouldn’t live to see defeats of Marc Antony and Brutus, and the eventual foundation of the Roman Empire under Augustus.

So what was for centuries a powerful Republic began to get shaky, and allowed for the eventual success of dictatorship (Don’t even think of making comparisons to the present—those conversations are so boring.  If anything, look just at organizational dynamics.  The United States is nothing like Rome, and doesn’t even approach the hegemony that Rome enjoyed.  That is the first, and false, assumption made by those that compare the United States to Rome.)  I was able in my last posts to show some of the culture that came out of Rome in the second and third centuries BC, right when Greece was on the wane and the Alexandrian kingdoms emerged.  Now we enter a new era…the Roman Republic becomes pretty much the only game in town, and has swallowed up a bunch of other civilizations in the process.  What does the last century of the Roman Republic look like?  What were people thinking once Augustus came to poweer, and how does culture operate as a "technology of power"?  How does understanding the context discussed above help to see the place of writers like Catallus, Horace, Virgil, and Ovid?  What the heck was Cicero talking about, and how did philosophical schools like the Stoics and Epicureans come to dominate Roman philosophical thinking?  Those are in the posts to come…posts that will be much richer as I understand what Romans like Cato and Augustus believed they lost, and wanted to get back to, and why we still read the things we do (answer: Virgil and Horace were on the Imperial payroll.  Ovid was not by the time the Metamorphoses was written, making a cut and dry thesis on patronage a little difficult).  And what the hell is a Christian, anyway?

For this post, I’m adding the extant parts of Livy’s history of the Roman Republic, From the Foundations of the City, to the list.  Livy’s history covers several centuries of republican history, much like Herodotus’s Histories.  Livy’s is interesting, though, because it’s written in a rhetorical, and thus somewhat persuasive style.  His intent?  Very much in line with what I’ve discussed in this post…he is forthright about his desire to demonstrate that the morals of Rome in his own time (59 BC through 17 AD) had degraded, and that everyone had to get back to the moral code on which Rome was based.  His story that best encapsulates this commitment is the famous story of the Rape of Lucretia, in which sexual assault against the protagonist leads to the punishment of the man who did it and the eventual overthrow of the Etruscan kings and the establishment of the Roman Republic.  Lucretia herself commits suicide, not because she is dishonored, but because she doesn’t want unchaste women in the future to ever have the option of lying about being raped as a cover for their adultery.  Intense.

5.02.2008

Herodotus in the New Yorker

The lastest edition of The New Yorker features a piece by Daniel Mendelsohn discussing the Landmark Herodotus.  I've written on Herodotus, and already written briefly on this new edition of Herodotus's Histories when its editor, Robert Strassler, appeared on Tom Ashbrooke's On Point.

I had heard about this piece from Christina, one of my few commenters, an avid New Yorker reader.  But I must say I was underwhelmed.  It all felt so...uninspired; the writer, a classicist himself, treats the material with the distance of quaintness.  The whole thing just seems like a brief nod, a "oh yes, of course, old Herodotus"...a snicker and a wink, and passing acknowledgments of the broader political and contemporary issues that the history sheds light on.  These reflections, though, stuck to cliche crap, and any comments on the actual edition seemed thrown in out of obligation.

The article gave me pause for a little introspection, though, and I should both admit and explore that here.  I just read John Berger's Ways of Seeing, and I think that's made a perspective of which I've always embraced resonate a little more: namely, that to acknowledge a work like Herodotus's as important, at least important enough to release a new edition of it, illustrates the power structures that still operate within the Western consciousness.  As Berger points out, cultural texts, and more relevantly the Eurocentric practice inherited from the Renaissance of valuing Classical artistic production, for centuries reinforced authority's dominance and the values which kept it in the supreme position.  And although one part of me thinks that I play into this, that to laugh off Herodotus as kitsche does not afford some appropriate respect to Herodotus (hence my introspection), I think my distaste for attitude Mendelsohn exhibits goes deeper.  He notes at the beginning of his piece that Thucydides always spoke to his generation of classicists a little more, and to drop the History of the Peloponnesian War in conversations regarding contemporary politics of two decades ago was to show one's acumen in Realpolitik.  Herodotus seemed to lack that applicability.  But to apply the values of these texts at all seems flawed to me.  I would have preferred a discussion of how Herodotus influenced centuries of thinkers and ideas, placing Herodotus within a time, and assigning him importance, and noting why this text is important enough to be re-released, because he was important to many thinkers that many still look to for answers (And I should note here that I don't quite know the motivation of the editor of Landmark to rerelease it). Instead, Mendelsohn giggles like a dinner part attendee at the quality of the writing, the tangents, etc., because they don't measure up to contemporary standards.  Well, no shit.  I'm glad that he's spending his time now on writing about the present through a comfortably firm (and comfortably institutional) paradigm, because I think he displays a real lack of how to value the past: deconstructing how he thinks now.

2.17.2008

Rhetoric, at long last

It seems that as a result of becoming distracted with deeper research and some much needed interior design work at my coffeehouse, I’ve taken much the same road with Plato and prose/non-verse writing as I did with tragedy and poetics. So much for smaller posts every week. In both cases, the extra work I have done has proven fundamental to a really rich, inclusive knowledge of the subject at hand (Plato and philosophical writing in Athens). I got plenty on Plato so far, believe you me…but that’s for another day. Here I’ll stick to rhetoric and prose as a form of speech and text that falls under the heading of discourse art, as Plato and Isocrates (not to be confused with Plato’s famous teacher, Socrates) would have thought about it. I start with the conflict between sophistry and philosophy, which took me down this road in the first place, and I’ll dig deeper into the finer points from there.

I begin in a way new to these posts, with a lengthy quote from a book on rhetoric and poetics that I’ve found invaluable, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity by Jeffrey Walker. Here, Professor Walker discusses the then novel prevalence of teaching purely pragmatic persuasion in Athens relative to the method by which oratory and writing had been perceived and taught before:
“To take a modern (if somewhat inexact) analogy for what was happening, it is as if the entire enterprise of the discipline of “English” were to become identified almost exclusively with the teaching of business and technical writing[…]while the teaching of business and technical writing represents a small fraction of the total curriculum of English and can be seen as a (relatively) recent extension of English from its traditional concern with mainly epideictic/”literary” kinds of discourse into more pragmatic kinds, it is also true that teaching business and technical writing draws an enormous clientele and is often by far the most popular (or in-demand) thing an English department does. It is not unusual for the number of students enrolled in business and technical writing courses to rival or exceed the number enrolled in all of an English department’s “literary” offerings put together—even if business and technical writing represent only a sliver of that deparment’s curriculum. The demand for such courses is spurred by the fact that large numbers of students see them (quite correctly) as being relevant to their future careers and thus directly relevant to their personal well-being—just as the Athenian citizen of the early fourth century B.C. could see training in rhetoreia as directly relevant to his and his family’s personal well-being, and even to his physical survival.

“To continue this analogy, imagine that people were to begin thinking of “English” simply as training in business and technical writing, and imagine that there had begun to appear departments of “English” that taught virtually nothing but such courses. Imagine further that people had begun referring to “English” not as English” but as (perhaps) “business writing,” or “practical writing,” or simply as “writing” or, to use the most common (though wildly inadequate) cover term now in use, as “composition.” And then imagine that this term shift were to be appropriated by an extremely influential philosopher—or a university president—and that, in the long run, it were to stick. All this imagining would make the analogy reasonably complete. For that is approximately what happens in Plato’s invocation of, and in his famous attack on, the name and notion of an ‘art of rhetoric,’ techne rhetorrike, and in Aristotle’s subsequent effort to recuperate techne rhetorike as a philosophically respectable discipline.” (Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pgs. 33-34.)

I chose this passage because I think it analogized well the development of prose writing and speaking and shows an important distinction between two forms of speech that Walker identifies according to a very Greek paradigm—epideiktikon and pragmatikon. And I think it was this distinction, and the description of prose styles out of the Greek poetic tradition (which Walker notes was largely disregarded by classical scholars until recently, a contention with which I agree after having read three books on rhetoric before I came to Walker) that not only brought rhetoric and prose together for me, but has provided such an indispensable education in Plato without which I don’t think I would’ve ever gotten a good grasp on the guy. But more on him later. Back to epideiktikon and pragmatikon.

In many oral traditions, one must distinguish between speech and oratory according to its audience—in purely pragmatic speech, one seeks to make a case to those who will judge, or those who must make a decision based on facts and argument. This speech is largely spontaneous, and it is not meant to be recorded, or even remembered. It is purely functional language. Epideikitokon, on the other hand, explores an idea—it inspires to action based on more deeply held beliefs and even seeks to explore these beliefs. It can praise and blame. But in a larger sense, if one is to take all of poetics as a form of epideiktikon, in strictly Homeric terms it sways the psyche from its original sense, persuaded or inspired to a new manner of thinking (early writing referred to this a as a form of witchcraft). Taken in this context, many components of a text contribute to its inspirational capacity—the idea, yes, but also the rhythm, whether or not it has a melody and if so, the scale, or “mode” (series of tones distinguished relatively according to a pre-determined interval between one another), the form of verse (iambic, elegiac, dactylic, etc.), and so on and so forth. Example: a song in a minor key makes you sad…why? Or certain verse forms associate best with lust and love, or prayer, or comedy…why? I suppose that’s a question for the neurophysicists out there…is it a learned association? Or does the brain naturally respond to certain tonal orders, which evoke a feeling in your brain, so that you immediately become festive, or introspective, or awed. I don’t know the answers to these questions. What I do know is that the Greeks had “figured out” these associations, and mastery in poetics, and subsequently in that which was to become known as the art of rhetoric (non-metered oratory, the “art of speaking well), relied on a mastery of utilizing the components available according to the orator’s purpose.

Ah, the purpose; the idea, my son…the truest pursuit, ideas. In order to fully grapple with ideas, we do not only utilize our capacity to think, but learn “how to think,” how to take full advantage or our reason. We’ve all gone to school, we’ve all had those friends who have challenged us by asking really weird questions. Many of us went to college, where, as it is commonly held after it’s all done, that one “learns how to learn.” Additionally, traveling abroad or meeting people from other cultures challenge us to look at things differently and with a new perspective. And as we grow older, as we meet more people and have a variety of new experiences, we acquire a mental dexterity used to approach really tough ideas…what is important to me? Is there a god or an afterlife? How should I treat other people, and on what terms should I expect other people to treat me? What is love? What is good or right behavior? Who should I vote for, if I vote at all, and why? These are ideas, the tough stuff, and the real inquiry that becomes both easier and harder the more we learn.

Well, my friends, in a surprise move (should obviously be taken as sarcasm) the Greeks had a system for this kind of inquiry too. It was called sophistry, or “the art of making wise” and cultivating the intellect. The ideas, the really tough issues and thoughts, were called logoi (singular: logos). The manner of pursuing these logoi was traditionally persuasion through oratory, and its purpose was to both participate in civic life by asking tough questions, like “how should our government operate?” or “what should be thought of as good and admirable behavior?”, but also just to think and live a moral and introspective life. I should add here that I am still talking about the domain of text classified as epideiktikon, in which most text of the oral tradition lies: poetics included. I find here that the old adage, which I paraphrase, that “poets lie” has a new resonance—whereas poetics and music seeks to contrive (or “persuade”) a feeling in the listener, this “new” kind of text, non-metered prose oratory, seeks to find that which is good and true, and inspire for the sake of finding the right course of action, the best behavior, the most functional or effective outcome.

And so with the “discovery” of this kind of thinking (and if I am to draw again on Bruno Snell, the real birth of the individual, a seemingly natural result to the Greeks’ centuries-long process of inquiry), came the rise of teachers in logon paideia, or “discourse education.” These were the original sophists. The most famed of these sophists included Isocrates and Gorgias, who sought primarily to educate in thinking, and secondarily to orate, as public speaking was in many ways a display of the speaker’s sophia, or capacity to reason. Teachers sought to prepare the higher echelons of Greek society for participation in public life (this participation was open to all in these upper echelons), and most of all to cultivate a capacity for eubolia, or “good judgment.” The journey toward oratorical mastery relied on a pursuit for the good and the just, a sense of which teachers sought to instill in their students.

Now to bring it back to the quote from the venerable Professor Walker, who teaches in my hometown of Austin, Texas (I should make my dad, also a sometime University of Texas employee, take him out to lunch), and distinguish further between pragmatikon and epideiktikon. As I noted, oratorical text cannot be confined only to demonstrative oratory seeking to argue a larger idea of the right and the true. A great deal of political movement and the judicial process occurs on a much more nuts and bolts process…that let’s make a deal (in the political arena), and he said/she said shit that makes up the body of evidence in a case brought against a person suspected of a crime. This is the realm of pragmatikon, or pragmatic speech. It does not dwell on that which is true, but on rational arguments that conform to what the listeners and participants have already agreed to be true. Said differently, it is a matter of audience…in the case of pragmatikon, one speaks to a group who must make a decision or a judgment based on facts and with a particular task in mind. While some upper echelon boys and men had an interest in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, many only pursued enough education in matters of oratory to be able to defend themselves in court (anyone could bring a case against anyone in Athens. Also, isn’t this why many people go to college or grad school now, for the functional purpose of getting a job?) Add to this the growing number of men who, finding that they possessed a natural gift for arguing a point or speaking publicly, who would bring false cases against the wealthy who they knew they could out-argue purely for the sake of financial gain for themselves. Thus a distinct interest in the purely “technical writing” that Walker notes was born, and the subsequent and deserved vitriol (see present-day-almost-universal opinions on trail lawyers and politicians…EXACTLY the same feeling, man) for those who only taught the pragmatic oratory, and those who used it for destructive and self-serving pursuits. The best teachers of the era, Plato and Isocrates, decried this development and encouraged oratory’s return to its roots in poetics and logoi.

I should note here the philosophical distinctions between Isocrates and Plato, who despite his anti-sophist associations in contemporary attitudes seems to me like something of a sophist himself according to the original usage of the term. The important points I’d like to note here is not only the expressed, documented respect these two seemed to have for one another (despite their disagreements), but the distinct philosophical points of view of the two, as well as their preferred form of pursuing truth. Isocrates gave us the old adage that “man is the measure of all things.” In this he meant that there was no real truth, at least one which can be comprehend and especially replicated and articulated by man. The only things to which our brain has access is logoi…the composite of all the logoi we have constitutes our own personal doxa, or set of opinions. But all this can be changed when the next new, better logos comes around with a persuasive enough argument to back it up. So all knowledge is largely transient, just a set of opinions that will likely change throughout our life. All we can do is our best to find the most expeditious logos for the problem at hand, which we decide on by debating one another utilizing the techniques of persuasion. Plato, on the other hand, absolutely believed in an absolute truth (see his theory of ideas) and its mathematical articulation (I’m working on a book about Pythagorean mathematical concepts, among other things, right now. I’ll include what I learn in the next post). He also believed as his teacher Socrates did, that instead of persuasion, dialectical discourse, the ability to work with one’s interlocutor in an argument or conversation, to wittle down the discussion to the real stuff of the argument, was superior to persuasive oratory as a manner of inquiry. On the whole, though, both men believed in the ability of teaching to convey the basis ethical behaviors and a sense of right, and both acted as real philosophers with their own moral commitments.

As for me, now that I’m closing up this massive post I can comment on my thoughts. Anyone who has read my past posts or discussed the matter with me knows that I’m in both the Isocrates and Plato camp when it comes to truth. This whole project seems somewhat based on an Isocratean idea—we are vessels, channelers, and transmitters of values. We are loci in vast networks, and constitute the construction of culture, and our doxa are the series of ideas to which we have been exposed in our life. On the other hand, I’m a real hold out that there is something individual in everyone. Whether or not that is an internal space in our brain, I’m doubtful…however I hold out hope that in my own process of deconstructing all those values and ideas that have been passed on to and inherited by me, I will find something that is truly mine. In this sense, I think I’m Platonic...this space is my connection to the eternal, by virtue of it being truly mine. The adventure continues on that idea.

I will close speaking of adventures in ideas. Lately it’s been the concept of virtue. I was educated as a real relativist, so I can’t help but wonder what (or whose) purpose certain assertions of “right” and “good” serve. I got to thinking about it today by a passing comment made by a composer for the Kronos quartet today on Weekend Edition. He notes that through music we can become better people (major paraphrase, humor me), which I find to bear very strong similarities with the Greek worldview. Based on the text I’ve become acquainted with, there seems to be a perspective that perceived beauty can be associated with virtue because of its adherence to more cosmologically derived proportions, orders, and other associations. And I think it all comes down to sources of values, be they externally inherited or good for the individual based on experience and learning. Not only do I think that this process of internalization is a part of socialization, i.e. taking as true that which society believes to be good, I am also beginning to see more and more the process by which the individual values him or herself. And that’s some deep shit, and a major part of why this project remains so personal to me. All the other writing I’ve done on this subject aside, one can’t help but tend toward a little introspection on the matter of how one values him or herself via societal beliefs on what makes a good person. In the end, I think this is something I’ll continue to explore, but with some boundaries drawn. Whereas we can very readily see what values are admired and thought to be good in a particular society, the sources are a little tougher (unless they’re deliberately constructed by certain societal transmitters for a particular purpose), and even more difficult to understand by asking “why?” My intent here is to explore why we order or compel at all, without relying on those terminological copouts of “human nature” or “power.” I think enough thinkers and writers and artists will appear in my future study that I will have ample opportunity to continue exploring these questions, however evasive and often speculative the answers may be. More adventures.

Next time, Plato’s Republic, the theory of ideas and the co-optation of Pythagorean mathematical and musical concepts into mainstream discourse. Believe it or not, all this will be unbelievably easier now that I’ve done this rhetoric jazz. I’m glad I took the time. I’ve included some text from Gorgias, Isocrates, and another famed Athenian orator, Demosthenes, on the list for good measure, and updated my additional source list to include Walker and Snell’s books. And boy howdy, am I ready to crack out Aristotle and Hellenistic Greece and get on to Rome and the early Christian church. I need a change. Soon…Thanks a bunch to Jeffrey Walker for his great book.

2.03.2008

Herodotus on On Point

This week on NPR member station WBUR's nationally syndicated show On Point, host Tom Ashbrook interviewed Robert Strassler, editor of the recently released Landmark Herodotus, the followup to the Landmark Thucydides, which Strassler edited in 1996. Strassler has a largely amateur and mainstream point of view on Herodotus, but in general the conversation gives some great insights on Herodotus's Histories and the challenge of producing a new edition of this important work. Access the interview here.

12.30.2007

The Ancient Historians, Part 1

Despite a busy few weeks, I’ve begun my study of the ancient historians by formulating a concept of history’s meaning and role in Greek society’s intellectual production. I’ve done this in an attempt to understand historical texts as a literary form, and I have developed an idea of history related to its derivation from the word “inquiry.” This will provide the basis for a helpful paradigm in my closer examination of the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon in the coming couple of weeks.
I have defined history as the inquiry into a system comprised of subjects and objects related to one another through interaction and/or association. The narrator and analyst of this system, the historian, identifies relevant actors and assigns relative importance to them, and details aspects of the system such as its origins, the nature of the dynamics between actors, and the definition and impact of forces within the system that effect change.
This definition takes into account elements of historical inquiry during the period I currently study such as the role of the historian and his perspective, and I have kept it broad enough to encompass disciplines we now consider distinct form the practice of history, (the natural sciences, economics, politics, ethnography, etc.) as the Greeks would have. By conceiving of history in this way, I break down my own long standing idea of history as simply a narrative of past events, and better place myself within the Greek worldview. Especially, given that history had its own muse, thus placing it among those disciplines that function to reveal and recreate the underlying order, I can now imagine inquiry as a more creative process. Perhaps the process of writing history is an inquiry into the order’s manifestation in human society and the physical world. Perhaps one could even intend to reveal a more universal truth, or order to things, by inquiring into a single series of events.
At present I think that future research into the historians I’ve chosen to study will reveal not only insights into the last points of the preceding paragraph, but will help me to understand further the concept of glory (the must of history, Clio, was called “the glorious one”), which I first encountered while learning about Homer. I suspect also that I may find some clues on how human behavior, and political organization, as well as the understanding of those events deemed important at the time, fit into the greater order. I think history’s job may be to deal with those issues.
In the near future I’ll be looking more closely at Herodotus, and more specifically at what compelled him to include such a detailed ethnography in his inquiry into the Persian Wars and his characterization of those conflicts as East v. West. I believe my study of Thucydides will reveal a good deal more about the “glory theme,” and perhaps even some insights that I may find useful as I continue into Plato and the emergence of an idea of the eternal in Greek society. The more political aspects of Thucydides excite me most of all...I’ve had a theory recently that political action within an institutional context reflects the purpose and actions of the entire organization. Which is to say, we internalize the institution’s values and make them our own. In this sense, structure becomes like another actor in any political history.
I’m considering new ways to learn about the development of science and math in the West, and I’m toying around with some ideas for a new project. The new one would be a lot more hands on, as I explore the technology and engineering in tandem with the mathematical and scientific advancements. Maybe I’ll finally learn a thing or two about astronomy. Until the next time.