Showing posts with label Isocrates. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Isocrates. Show all posts

2.04.2009

Schools of Thought in Rome, and the Intellectual World of Cicero

I've recently wrapped up an examination of Cicero, approaching him from the context of the vast array of beliefs and philosophies that thrived throughout Roman territory and the Mediterranean generally.  This diversity of thought prevailed for centuries before Cicero, and would continue for centuries after him.  What strikes me as peculiar and challenging as I try to understand the opportunities for contemplation available to Romans is the lack of any real mainstream or state sponsored religion.  As long as the populace respected state sponsored holidays, it seems like people could worship pretty much whomever or whatever they wanted. 

Gods like Jupiter and Minerva are among many forces in the world unseen that can have an impact on our lives.  Ancestral worship, carried over from the Etruscans, remained a major influence in people's lives, as has been noted in my first post about Roman art.  Superstitions used for good luck or for curative purposes, originating from God-knows-where, abounded.  Foreign influences that entered the Roman realm as its borders expanded also paved the way for foreign religions, and the activity of priests that guarded the associated rites and rituals.  Worship of Ra and other Egyptian deities came into vogue in Rome even before the inclusion of Egypt into the Roman empire after the Battle of Actium, and interest in Egyptian culture and religion positively exploded among the upper classes in the century that followed.  Groups dedicated to Mithras, from Babylon and Persia, as well as Sumerian astrology were not uncommon among even the most mainstream Romans.  An abundance of figures from the Greek pantheon had their own worshippers, centered around temples and oracles dedicated to that god alone. Major changes were afoot in Judaism, but it was Herod, the King of Judea and a servant to Rome, who rebuilt the temple, and by the turn of the millennium we begin to see the growth of Rabbinic Judaism, gnosticism, and that little subsect of Jews known much later on as Christians.

Of greatest interest to me is the persistence of philosophical schools throughout the Roman empire, with their roots as far back as the Academy in Athens and enjoying widespread popularity across the Mediterranean.  When understood in the context of the diversity of options for religious devotion, these competing schools of thought (literally) amaze me.  The teachings of men like Epicurus, Zeno, and Diogenes boggle my mind, not necessarily because of their insights, but because their lessons and views provided the basis for centuries old traditions of teachers and scholars that propagated and added to the original thinkers' work.  I am stunned and in awe watching a body of data become a discourse, to see it transmit and grow independent of politics or geography.

This was the intellectual and contemplative world of Rome--for the elite, almost limitless availability to a variety of world views and teachings.  Greek methods of teaching persisted, becoming all the more prevalent once Rome defeats Greece.  Members of the Roman upper class brought literate and well-educated Greeks (often enslaved) to educate their children.  Wandering sophists gave lessons in math, philosophy, and rhetoric, much as they did in the Greece of Aristotle.  Societies of men devoted to cynicism, stoicism, and epicureanism (among many others), set up schools in all the major cities to inculcate interested students in their system of thought.  Much like the syncretism of Roman art, philosophy also enjoyed an eclectic heyday under the Roman empire, wherein one chose that which suited him best.

Cicero, for his part, chose Academic skepticism.  First advanced by Pyrrho, a former soldier in Alexander's army, and later promoted by Pyrrho's disciple Timon, does not receive a good review from my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell:  "Scepticism," he writes in The History of Western Philosophy, "was a lazy man's consolation, since it showed the ignorant to be as wise as the reputed men of learning" (pg. 234, see links on the right for copyright and citation info on my edition).  In my mind, however, skepticism seems the most obvious heir apparent to thinkers like Isocrates and Plato, who questioned through dialectical reasoning the very premise of deductive reasoning itself.  In fact, for many years after the death of Aristotle, the Academy remained the center of Academic skeptical thought.  Cicero, for his part, believes as Plato did: that although one can be convinced of the greater probability of one argument over another, he will never achieve absolute certainty of the truth.  Although it doesn't seem that he ever makes a metaphysical leap as Plato does from this spot, causing him to question sensory experience in general or considering a metaphysical sphere beyond rational thought, he channels this assumption into some very cunning political writing.  As such, his thinking is although remarkably similar to Aristotle's in terms of the discussion of a politician/philosopher duality and the way by which one creates a great city and state.  It's practical, and, well, skeptical of everyone's motives, but still seems to express real optimism by remaining firmly planted in this sphere (unlike Plato).  His greatest concern is to translate the thinking of Plato, Aristotle, and others into his time and the circumstances of Rome itself, and trying to make sense of it in a way that would be useful to building a great state.  This is a stellar example of the peculiar creativity of Roman syncretism.

Well, now that I've finally got all that philosophy stuff out of me, I can begin to add some new writings to the list.  The problem with many of the aforementioned schools of thought is that few primary sources exist.  Therefore, I will satisfy myself with adding Diogenes Laertius's Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, which for many centuries has been the go-to text for hearing accounts of the lives and teachings of guys like Zeno (stoicism), Epicurus (epicureanism), and Diogenes (a different Diogenes--this one helped to found cynicism).  In addition, I'll be adding a couple of other writers to the list along with Cicero and his Laws, specifically essays by Seneca the Younger (a stoic philosopher and tutor to Nero), and Emperor Marcus Aurelius's Meditations (Marcus Aurelius was also very scholarly and a stoic, and reigned at what is likely the height of Roman power).  Next up, literature in the age of Augustus, Roman novel writing, my last post on art, and Plotinus (The founder of neo-platonism and the last great philosopher of antiquity).  Then on to the Christians...

7.01.2008

Order/Disorder Part 1: Limit

In a two part series to finish my exploration of the Greek body of text called Order/Disorder that I introduced in my last post, I discuss in two entries the basis of the moral code derived from a belief in a cosmic order, and the cultural production that resulted as adherence to that morality began to wane. Here, I build on the idea that order and logic provided the basis for Greek cultural and intellectual production throughout much of the Classical age, and suggest that this corresponds with the spread of Pythagoreanism.

The process of understanding Pythagoras has made the dynamic Greek civilization more understandable to me, especially as I’ve placed analyses by guys like Snell in a more informed historical context (It’s been very hard to find a discussion of Greek intellectual and cultural history that actually discussed sources). The Greek myths best known from the works attributed to the bard Homer had existed for centuries by the time Pythagoras appears in text in the early 6th century BCE, and a comparison of the two paradigms that the two aforementioned thinkers represent reveals the way in which thinking could open up, allowing for new perspectives of the self, the soul, and the nature of the physical world. The ancient Greek mythology that we all know and love relied on a set of assumption with only a very loose understanding of the body and what animates it, and believed in a pantheon of gods with all the caprices and brutality of human beings. Fate unfolds without any design, the threads of space knit together by the blind almost by chance, and as the tapestry forms across time, gods and men act and react within the physical world we can perceive with the senses. Kosmos (order), on the other hand, has purpose. The world operates according to a larger system—objects in space are units that operate as part of the whole, each with a value defined by an overarching structure. It gives man a new power—the ability to know and predict. It also gives him a personal space and individual choice (the source of the concept for the soul, be it material or immaterial).

Pythagoras gets credit for being the first transmitter of this kind of thinking, which would have far reaching effects on the Greek body of text that unfolded over the centuries following his life. Certainly Pythagoras was not the first to suggest some greater order to the universe—not only had he received an education in Egyptian and Babylonian traditions, he also continued the ancient Greek tradition attributed to Orpheus and his cult and before that, Dionysus. However, the rise of Pythagoreanism (at present ignoring his possible sources), corresponds to the rise of a different way of thinking—the growth of the cult of Apollo (which ceases to see him, and the muses which follow him, as very human-like creatures—anthropomorphic—and more like the ideal being and keeper of the order and of its revelation), and the burgeoning prevalence in text of references to the self and the individual mystical experience, that ecstatic moment of awe and wonder at the world and one’s place in it.

The nitty-gritty of Pythagoreanism revolves around number—but not as we would think of it; certainly, it’s almost violent to consider putting as much faith as they in what the contemporary mainstream would consider coincidence. Pythagoreanism itself took me quite a while to wrap my head around, and I had to research a great deal (thank you to Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier’s excellent book Measuring Heaven for its analysis of the growth of the Pythagorean school and its impact on art from the Classical period through the Middle Ages). I even visited New York City just for the day to attend a philosophy chat to which I was invited at Logos Bookstore on the Upper East Side just to ask the publishers who were sponsoring it some questions about Pythagoras’s number theory and ethics.

Fundamentally, it requires a different concept of numbers altogether, one not of magnitude (like how many apples are in a barrel, times 8 barrels, etc.), but of limit and definition—points in the infinite which, when seen as a series, provide structure for and make sense of the vast indefinite. The analogy of the monochord pulled it together for me—like on a guitar, where one can push the string an infinite number of places to create a new tone, one must have a sense of proportion with the original string’s length to really develop a system of tones based on ratio. Although the units one would choose to make those ratios (3/4, 8/9), etc., may seem arbitrary in an absolute sense, when utilized consistently in a defined system it makes a perfectly logical operating system. Thus, number does not have value in and of itself, but only relative to other points in the system, regardless of whether that system is constrained on a line, on a surface, in space, and in time.

I know it seems kind of nutty, but its actually wildly fun to figure out and really throw yourself into—no longer seeing just components, but the entire system and its intended operation. The Pythagoreans believed that the existence of ratios at all was not the order itself, but simply evidence, a reflection, of the larger system and design to all planes of existence (there are myriad approaches to the questions that this perspective allows relative to the end point of this whole system, the place of the individual within it, and so on. Please see my Plato post for just a couple of these responses by the thinkers known as the Pre-Socratics and by Plato himself). And so much Greek cultural and intellectual production reflects this assumption…statues that take into account the entire human form in order to create the image of an ideal man; temples where every angle and span work together in order to create a structure that inspires a sense of awe and majesty; an oral argument that makes the listener dive into his very beliefs and come away from the speech thinking differently about himself and his society; a social structure whose sole purpose is the just, and the good, and the right.

All these examples I list, though, hinge on a the creator’s commitment to a fundamental concept, and as I consider them it seems very clear to me how (certainly not why...that I'll explore later) the Greek text began to fall away from this manner of seeing artistic production into a world of disorder and confusion, as Greek civilization did by the early 3rd century BCE. The fundamental concept to which I refer is harmonia: the idea that the producer created a form of true beauty through its logical consistency, through its application of components whose value derived from a central rubric centered on the purpose of the form. Furthermore that the very purpose of creating the form was to coincide, or harmonize, with the greater order of existence. That is a question of morality—a commitment to the grand design by creating a system whose purpose worked toward that design’s intent. Thus it’s not a casting off of logic—certainly not—but a hazy idea of why one should use that logic at all. And that’s a matter of faith and personal purpose (I would suggest that the whole thing requires an initial inductive leap, but that’s because I’m an immoral person). As the Greeks discovered the power of a logical system, be it in music or oratory or art, many began to utilize it for their own personal gain instead of a moral code based on a concept of the universal order (see my post on rhetoric to read my own exploration of the philosophical problems caused by the work of the sophists, and a discussion of dialectic argument as a part of that inquiry). By the time Alexander rolls around in Greece, the body of text that we’ve inherited reflects a slowdown (although certainly not an end) to inquiry into the nature of order, and a greater priority given to functional knowledge created for the sake of application (See Euclid and Archimedes), without a coinciding discussion of the merit of the creator’s intent and the endpoint he or she pursues.

And so we see the philosophical discussion pushed to the edges in the new world of disorder. There, the schools and tribes of marginalized peoples who carried on the mystical traditions of the past would give birth to Stoicism, Skepticism, and of course, Christianity. Although Christianity will have to wait until the Italian peninsula and Rome, next post I’ll discuss Hellenistic literature, art, and other philosophical movements as I explore culture in a world of disorder.

4.01.2008

Turtles all the way down...


All told I’ve spent months working on Plato and placing him within my network. And believe it or not, this post discusses him and his work. I haven’t had any real major epiphanies with this one, which doesn’t present any dilemma per se, just the curious development of something coming together and making sense for me through lots of research and thinking alone. No moment of inspiration in the shower, no butcher paper on the walls as I paint words across bare space with charcoal, swigging on a bottle of wine and listening to A Love Supreme while my girlfriend expresses concern for me relative to my mood disorder. I hesitate, for fear of reverting to my well-utilized dramatic organ, to suggest that my method of thinking seems to operate analogously with whatever it is I’m studying, that I’ve moved beyond the age of inspiration from the muses into an age of quiet contemplation and logical enquiry. I think instead I’ll just stick with the idea that I’m growing more disciplined as a writer and I’m dealing with a complex set of ideas that no single, driving generality can appropriately explain. Kind of a drag—oversimplification and drunkenness are a blast. Besides, if the analogy linking my own thinking with the worldview I study, I would have to have a fierce religious fervor for the answers I’ve discovered while studying Plato. He certainly felt that way. Upon deducing the very stuff of the cosmos itself, he declared it, and meditation upon it, the source of Good and Right, and based his own, distinctive philosophy based on this declaration of faith. Strangely enough, this idea became one of the bases of the Western paradigm.

I propose to illustrate in this post the sources of Plato’s opinions and commitments, linking him to the traditions on which I’ve written already and some I haven’t, and showing how those became the philosophy that had an impact on thought well beyond Plato’s own era into modern times. Plato’s genius fascinates me, largely because he created a philosophy that resonated so strongly with generation after generation of people, and did so by reconsidering and reconfiguring a variety of disparate intellectual traditions. I operate here on the thesis that he goes beyond reconciling major components of his influences, namely his profession as a teacher of rhetoric and his embrace of the physical and metaphysical ideas of his philosophical forebears. He also unifies them with a unique set of ideas with actual societal application by creating a distinct ethical system. In the end, these societal and philosophical influences produced a data set from which Plato produced his monumental oeuvre.

Among the societal influences, his profession of a teacher of rhetoric provided a substantial foundation, and by working within the tradition of rhetorical education, Plato embraced the perspective that observed and harnessed the power of communicative ordered systems of all kinds to influence the mind of the individual. This included music, metered poetry, forms…and behind it all, an idea. A concept, which the creator wished to evoke in he or she who saw, or heard, or processed at all the patterns and ratios inherent in any work. This tradition, I think, is a testament to the remarkable, inherited knowledge that the Greeks systematized and formulated into applicable structures that a producer of media could use for a purpose, any purpose. The real breakthrough of the prose writers, who came on the heels of the poetic tradition of meters and melodies, was the sense of an idea underlying every communicated object, and harnessing that power to serve certain ideas themselves for an even greater purpose. Thus arose the question of those ideas which had the greatest use, and the fundamental component of rhetorical education—to instill a sense of service to society and state, and to utilize the knowledge of the power of ideas to bring about an outcome that served an ethical purpose. As is the tendency of the Greeks, though, the enquiry would not cease, and the question of the basis of the deeper ethical purpose arose among the most notable teachers of rhetoric.

Plato himself sought to move past the control that these poetic formulas enabled, and found answers to the questions posed by the sources of the deeper ethics of applying these formulas by espousing a vision of a fundamental truth that went beyond sounds, forms, and ideas. Whereas Plato’s contemporary, Isocrates, believed that “man is the measure of all things,” and thus that no basis for the ideas underlying any communicative form existed, Plato himself adopted not only the metaphysical ordering principles of many of his philosophical predecessors, but also the religious fervor for the majesty and inherent goodness of the principles of this order, posited previously by men like Pythagoras and Socrates. His commitment to the belief that a foundation for this proper use of the control one could wield over individuals derived from a sense of a metaphysically conceived order of the world, and a certainty that this order was the source of all that was good.

That’s quite a leap, in my eyes—to not only suggest a cosmology, but to assign value to it by saying all that resembles it or derives from it is Good itself, and we should seek to reproduce it in society and in our own lives as an act of devotion to the pursuit of the Good. Plato was certainly not the first one to conceive of such an order, or even express such religious fervor for it. Plato in fact built on concepts of metaphysical order professed by adherents to a fairly distinct school of though, which posited an alternative cosmology to that of the orally transmitted mainstream tradition written down by Homer and Hesiod. I think one should note the work of men like Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Thales (notable names among many who comprise the list of “Presocratic philosophers” whom I have referred to as Plato’s predecessors) not because of the substance of their incredibly esoteric work—Heraclitus wrote in a series of riddles and oracle-like paradoxes; Parmenides’ On Nature has two sections, the Way of Truth, and the Way of Opinion, which completely contradicts the Way of Truth. It kind of makes sense in the end, but only with a little help. Regardless of the differences between the dozen or so writers who make up the Presocratics about change, and oneness, the proposition that a grand design exists, and a grand designer, the greatest contribution of this school was the suggestion that the world we sense, the physical world in which the entirety of Homeric, and even the Hebrew, cosmology lied, was not the only sphere of existence. Through the use of reason and logic, an entirely new sphere of thought and value became available to humanity.
The point that a distinction between a world we sense and a world we can deduce and think up, no matter how much it may contradict the world we experience around us, is absolutely crucial. This premise forms the backbone of Plato’s thought, and I believe the backbone of Western thought until present day. Although transmitted through a variety of different textual loci, the idea that one can experience a world entirely through thought, that may have little or no foundation in lived experience, has played a crucial role in the body of text that constitutes the West, and many other cultural constructs as well. Example—in very Greek terms, can a completely straight line, or a perfect sphere really exist in the real world? Or from the theological viewpoint, have you ever seen, and thus have, some picture of heaven? Scientifically, have you ever seen an atom with your bare eyes?

Although it gets a little muddy with the analogies (as analogies are wont to do), I think I make my point…the real kicker is the thought espoused by many of Plato’s predecessors and by Plato as well…that this world conceived of through logic alone, of perfect shapes and rational numbers and even the soul itself, is more real than the world we encounter with our senses. By utilizing the part of our brain that deals with these problems, the nous, we connect with a world that we all share, that goes far beyond individual experience and is true for everyone, and thus, in a sense, a shared knowledge. Furthermore, some of these thinkers make some big leaps—not only is this sphere more real if only for its consistency, it is unchanging and eternal, and the source of all we do sense (Pythagoras would suggest, because all matter in the physical world comes from the same, perfect source, indications of perfection can be perceived in the physical world by understanding the relationship between objects in space. See harmonics). Lastly, and here’s the leap of faith, this perfect world, so real and unchanging, is also the truly Good and Right. An understanding of the eternal world can help us to understand the secrets to right living, a properly run society, and the basis of morals and ethics entirely. Those damn Greeks—very intent on finding the big picture and the master plan to everything: rational, and clearly delineated...So enticing...

Believe it or not, these are really only the foundations of Plato’s ideas. Although he talked about some of this stuff in dialogues like Parmenides and the Symposium, his really famous and influential work took another step beyond all of the thinking mentioned above, as he combined the societal commitment and problems of communicable knowledge for which the rhetorical teachers were most useful, with the philosophical conundrums arising from metaphysical enquiry, deductive logic, and geometry. He suggested that he had found the source of universal truth, ethics, and the very ideas of good and bad. However, in addition and very importantly, he understood and utilized these concepts in concert with the Greeks’ knowledge, acquired over many centuries, of the physical world and the human mind that developed into the formulae of music and poetics. He created a rationale that united the sensory and the eternal world, which would influence his ethical code.

Plato creates a logical system of societal governance based on the ideas of unchanging stasis, deriving answers from the nous, etc., and lays it all out in his most famous and important work, the Republic (I don’t think I speak presumptuously by calling it the most famous and important—it’s the most original thinking he puts out there, and as for famous, the case in point is that if you’ve read Plato at all, you’ve read the Republic). Based on a particular intent for a society of a particular size, Plato suggests the best manner of social organization for achieving those ends in the most effective and just manner. Justice is a key word in this discussion, as the definition he suggests for justice derives from his more metaphysical ideas of ethics—justice is not simply the right act, but the ambition to do right. And as for the theory of ideas…he just reconfigures the metaphysical concepts posited by the presocratics and makes them applicable to his own realm of expertise—human thought and ideas.

As I close up my understanding of Plato, I certainly have my critiques of him. He certainly has his predispositions that would prejudice him toward a societal model that was more than a little authoritarian, aristocratic, oligarchic, etc. He had lived through the Peloponnesian war, and seen the social unrest of the period and the destructive aspects of both mob hysteria and the conflicts between doing what’s best for oneself and for one’s state. And very importantly he had watched a purportedly democratic society condemn his teacher, whom he must have surely believed to be the most valuable member of his community, to death. I mention all of this because I doubt that Plato saw much use, according to his conception of the rightly ordered society, in personal empowerment and democratization. Although the capacity to connect with the greater truth is open to everyone in Plato’s eyes, in a rightly ordered society one can have the Good by leaving lawmaking to those who are best at connecting with the greater truth, and as long as every societal role has a purpose inspired by the eternal good and right, it doesn’t really matter if the person playing that role knows it—as long as they are serving the good.

I know, it all gets a bit complicated, and in the end we can’t even really know what Plato thought, only what he might have or probably thought, given the nature of his texts. The guy wrote a lot over a long period of time, after all, and he embraced the idea of leading one to the truth, first exercised by Heraclitus and Socrates, instead of arguing that his truth was right. The process of discourse he used in this leading process is called dialectics, and was his preferred manner of teaching. I note this because in the end, Plato’s texts are literary works. Did he really mean what he said? Or did he intend for a certain outcome to come about through his works, independent of the intent he claims to have in his writing? As for the utopian vision put forth in the Republic, the utopia as a logical model, not intended for actuality but instead as a logical challenge presented through potential courses of action, would become a well used literary device that serves a much larger purpose than if it were actually made a reality. Regardless of Plato’s intent, which we may never know, he certainly got us all thinking with his adorable little dialectical style.

So I can’t say that I’ll ever be perfectly satisfied with Plato. I’m certainly not satisfied with the treatment that only a few pages can give his entire philosophical project. But I have to move on. There will be more Platos in my future, I’m sure. Now that I’m closing up with the Greeks, given that I only have a couple of more posts related to them planned, I’ve gotten a little introspective about my study of them. Maybe I can curry that into a bit of writing that touches on my own experience learning about the Greek worldview, and what I’ve gotten out of it. Or I can just get real drunk and be like the Dionysians, escaping from all these ordering principles and physical responses to the world that have even a trace of predictability, and really revel in the freedom implied therein. Regardless, Plato was a big benchmark, and I’ve met it and will move on. Aristotle next…thanks for being patient.

2.18.2008

A Clarification by Prof. Walker

I've been in touch with Professor Jeffrey Walker, the author of the book on rhetoric I like so much. He's helped out again by clarifying a suspicion that I articulated in my last post when I wrote:

I should note here the philosophical distinctions between Isocrates and Plato, who despite his anti-sophist associations in contemporary attitudes seems to me like something of a sophist himself according to the original usage of the term.

Prof. Walker wrote in an e-mail today his response to this thought:

About Plato as "sophist": yes. Although he, like Isocrates, wanted to
distance himself from the run-of-the-mill sophists by calling what he did "philosophy" (Isocrates, by the way, was the first to use that term), Greeks at that time would have referred to them both as sophists--professional teachers of , which meant both "wisdom" and "skill" (as in the modern phrases, "know-how" and "savoir faire"). There are fifth and fourth century writers who explicitly refer to Socrates as a sophist (Aristophanes and Aeschines), and I have seen later references to the followers of Socrates -- Plato, etc. -- as the "Socratic sophists."

Thanks for looking out, JW.

2.17.2008

Rhetoric, at long last

It seems that as a result of becoming distracted with deeper research and some much needed interior design work at my coffeehouse, I’ve taken much the same road with Plato and prose/non-verse writing as I did with tragedy and poetics. So much for smaller posts every week. In both cases, the extra work I have done has proven fundamental to a really rich, inclusive knowledge of the subject at hand (Plato and philosophical writing in Athens). I got plenty on Plato so far, believe you me…but that’s for another day. Here I’ll stick to rhetoric and prose as a form of speech and text that falls under the heading of discourse art, as Plato and Isocrates (not to be confused with Plato’s famous teacher, Socrates) would have thought about it. I start with the conflict between sophistry and philosophy, which took me down this road in the first place, and I’ll dig deeper into the finer points from there.

I begin in a way new to these posts, with a lengthy quote from a book on rhetoric and poetics that I’ve found invaluable, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity by Jeffrey Walker. Here, Professor Walker discusses the then novel prevalence of teaching purely pragmatic persuasion in Athens relative to the method by which oratory and writing had been perceived and taught before:
“To take a modern (if somewhat inexact) analogy for what was happening, it is as if the entire enterprise of the discipline of “English” were to become identified almost exclusively with the teaching of business and technical writing[…]while the teaching of business and technical writing represents a small fraction of the total curriculum of English and can be seen as a (relatively) recent extension of English from its traditional concern with mainly epideictic/”literary” kinds of discourse into more pragmatic kinds, it is also true that teaching business and technical writing draws an enormous clientele and is often by far the most popular (or in-demand) thing an English department does. It is not unusual for the number of students enrolled in business and technical writing courses to rival or exceed the number enrolled in all of an English department’s “literary” offerings put together—even if business and technical writing represent only a sliver of that deparment’s curriculum. The demand for such courses is spurred by the fact that large numbers of students see them (quite correctly) as being relevant to their future careers and thus directly relevant to their personal well-being—just as the Athenian citizen of the early fourth century B.C. could see training in rhetoreia as directly relevant to his and his family’s personal well-being, and even to his physical survival.

“To continue this analogy, imagine that people were to begin thinking of “English” simply as training in business and technical writing, and imagine that there had begun to appear departments of “English” that taught virtually nothing but such courses. Imagine further that people had begun referring to “English” not as English” but as (perhaps) “business writing,” or “practical writing,” or simply as “writing” or, to use the most common (though wildly inadequate) cover term now in use, as “composition.” And then imagine that this term shift were to be appropriated by an extremely influential philosopher—or a university president—and that, in the long run, it were to stick. All this imagining would make the analogy reasonably complete. For that is approximately what happens in Plato’s invocation of, and in his famous attack on, the name and notion of an ‘art of rhetoric,’ techne rhetorrike, and in Aristotle’s subsequent effort to recuperate techne rhetorike as a philosophically respectable discipline.” (Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pgs. 33-34.)

I chose this passage because I think it analogized well the development of prose writing and speaking and shows an important distinction between two forms of speech that Walker identifies according to a very Greek paradigm—epideiktikon and pragmatikon. And I think it was this distinction, and the description of prose styles out of the Greek poetic tradition (which Walker notes was largely disregarded by classical scholars until recently, a contention with which I agree after having read three books on rhetoric before I came to Walker) that not only brought rhetoric and prose together for me, but has provided such an indispensable education in Plato without which I don’t think I would’ve ever gotten a good grasp on the guy. But more on him later. Back to epideiktikon and pragmatikon.

In many oral traditions, one must distinguish between speech and oratory according to its audience—in purely pragmatic speech, one seeks to make a case to those who will judge, or those who must make a decision based on facts and argument. This speech is largely spontaneous, and it is not meant to be recorded, or even remembered. It is purely functional language. Epideikitokon, on the other hand, explores an idea—it inspires to action based on more deeply held beliefs and even seeks to explore these beliefs. It can praise and blame. But in a larger sense, if one is to take all of poetics as a form of epideiktikon, in strictly Homeric terms it sways the psyche from its original sense, persuaded or inspired to a new manner of thinking (early writing referred to this a as a form of witchcraft). Taken in this context, many components of a text contribute to its inspirational capacity—the idea, yes, but also the rhythm, whether or not it has a melody and if so, the scale, or “mode” (series of tones distinguished relatively according to a pre-determined interval between one another), the form of verse (iambic, elegiac, dactylic, etc.), and so on and so forth. Example: a song in a minor key makes you sad…why? Or certain verse forms associate best with lust and love, or prayer, or comedy…why? I suppose that’s a question for the neurophysicists out there…is it a learned association? Or does the brain naturally respond to certain tonal orders, which evoke a feeling in your brain, so that you immediately become festive, or introspective, or awed. I don’t know the answers to these questions. What I do know is that the Greeks had “figured out” these associations, and mastery in poetics, and subsequently in that which was to become known as the art of rhetoric (non-metered oratory, the “art of speaking well), relied on a mastery of utilizing the components available according to the orator’s purpose.

Ah, the purpose; the idea, my son…the truest pursuit, ideas. In order to fully grapple with ideas, we do not only utilize our capacity to think, but learn “how to think,” how to take full advantage or our reason. We’ve all gone to school, we’ve all had those friends who have challenged us by asking really weird questions. Many of us went to college, where, as it is commonly held after it’s all done, that one “learns how to learn.” Additionally, traveling abroad or meeting people from other cultures challenge us to look at things differently and with a new perspective. And as we grow older, as we meet more people and have a variety of new experiences, we acquire a mental dexterity used to approach really tough ideas…what is important to me? Is there a god or an afterlife? How should I treat other people, and on what terms should I expect other people to treat me? What is love? What is good or right behavior? Who should I vote for, if I vote at all, and why? These are ideas, the tough stuff, and the real inquiry that becomes both easier and harder the more we learn.

Well, my friends, in a surprise move (should obviously be taken as sarcasm) the Greeks had a system for this kind of inquiry too. It was called sophistry, or “the art of making wise” and cultivating the intellect. The ideas, the really tough issues and thoughts, were called logoi (singular: logos). The manner of pursuing these logoi was traditionally persuasion through oratory, and its purpose was to both participate in civic life by asking tough questions, like “how should our government operate?” or “what should be thought of as good and admirable behavior?”, but also just to think and live a moral and introspective life. I should add here that I am still talking about the domain of text classified as epideiktikon, in which most text of the oral tradition lies: poetics included. I find here that the old adage, which I paraphrase, that “poets lie” has a new resonance—whereas poetics and music seeks to contrive (or “persuade”) a feeling in the listener, this “new” kind of text, non-metered prose oratory, seeks to find that which is good and true, and inspire for the sake of finding the right course of action, the best behavior, the most functional or effective outcome.

And so with the “discovery” of this kind of thinking (and if I am to draw again on Bruno Snell, the real birth of the individual, a seemingly natural result to the Greeks’ centuries-long process of inquiry), came the rise of teachers in logon paideia, or “discourse education.” These were the original sophists. The most famed of these sophists included Isocrates and Gorgias, who sought primarily to educate in thinking, and secondarily to orate, as public speaking was in many ways a display of the speaker’s sophia, or capacity to reason. Teachers sought to prepare the higher echelons of Greek society for participation in public life (this participation was open to all in these upper echelons), and most of all to cultivate a capacity for eubolia, or “good judgment.” The journey toward oratorical mastery relied on a pursuit for the good and the just, a sense of which teachers sought to instill in their students.

Now to bring it back to the quote from the venerable Professor Walker, who teaches in my hometown of Austin, Texas (I should make my dad, also a sometime University of Texas employee, take him out to lunch), and distinguish further between pragmatikon and epideiktikon. As I noted, oratorical text cannot be confined only to demonstrative oratory seeking to argue a larger idea of the right and the true. A great deal of political movement and the judicial process occurs on a much more nuts and bolts process…that let’s make a deal (in the political arena), and he said/she said shit that makes up the body of evidence in a case brought against a person suspected of a crime. This is the realm of pragmatikon, or pragmatic speech. It does not dwell on that which is true, but on rational arguments that conform to what the listeners and participants have already agreed to be true. Said differently, it is a matter of audience…in the case of pragmatikon, one speaks to a group who must make a decision or a judgment based on facts and with a particular task in mind. While some upper echelon boys and men had an interest in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, many only pursued enough education in matters of oratory to be able to defend themselves in court (anyone could bring a case against anyone in Athens. Also, isn’t this why many people go to college or grad school now, for the functional purpose of getting a job?) Add to this the growing number of men who, finding that they possessed a natural gift for arguing a point or speaking publicly, who would bring false cases against the wealthy who they knew they could out-argue purely for the sake of financial gain for themselves. Thus a distinct interest in the purely “technical writing” that Walker notes was born, and the subsequent and deserved vitriol (see present-day-almost-universal opinions on trail lawyers and politicians…EXACTLY the same feeling, man) for those who only taught the pragmatic oratory, and those who used it for destructive and self-serving pursuits. The best teachers of the era, Plato and Isocrates, decried this development and encouraged oratory’s return to its roots in poetics and logoi.

I should note here the philosophical distinctions between Isocrates and Plato, who despite his anti-sophist associations in contemporary attitudes seems to me like something of a sophist himself according to the original usage of the term. The important points I’d like to note here is not only the expressed, documented respect these two seemed to have for one another (despite their disagreements), but the distinct philosophical points of view of the two, as well as their preferred form of pursuing truth. Isocrates gave us the old adage that “man is the measure of all things.” In this he meant that there was no real truth, at least one which can be comprehend and especially replicated and articulated by man. The only things to which our brain has access is logoi…the composite of all the logoi we have constitutes our own personal doxa, or set of opinions. But all this can be changed when the next new, better logos comes around with a persuasive enough argument to back it up. So all knowledge is largely transient, just a set of opinions that will likely change throughout our life. All we can do is our best to find the most expeditious logos for the problem at hand, which we decide on by debating one another utilizing the techniques of persuasion. Plato, on the other hand, absolutely believed in an absolute truth (see his theory of ideas) and its mathematical articulation (I’m working on a book about Pythagorean mathematical concepts, among other things, right now. I’ll include what I learn in the next post). He also believed as his teacher Socrates did, that instead of persuasion, dialectical discourse, the ability to work with one’s interlocutor in an argument or conversation, to wittle down the discussion to the real stuff of the argument, was superior to persuasive oratory as a manner of inquiry. On the whole, though, both men believed in the ability of teaching to convey the basis ethical behaviors and a sense of right, and both acted as real philosophers with their own moral commitments.

As for me, now that I’m closing up this massive post I can comment on my thoughts. Anyone who has read my past posts or discussed the matter with me knows that I’m in both the Isocrates and Plato camp when it comes to truth. This whole project seems somewhat based on an Isocratean idea—we are vessels, channelers, and transmitters of values. We are loci in vast networks, and constitute the construction of culture, and our doxa are the series of ideas to which we have been exposed in our life. On the other hand, I’m a real hold out that there is something individual in everyone. Whether or not that is an internal space in our brain, I’m doubtful…however I hold out hope that in my own process of deconstructing all those values and ideas that have been passed on to and inherited by me, I will find something that is truly mine. In this sense, I think I’m Platonic...this space is my connection to the eternal, by virtue of it being truly mine. The adventure continues on that idea.

I will close speaking of adventures in ideas. Lately it’s been the concept of virtue. I was educated as a real relativist, so I can’t help but wonder what (or whose) purpose certain assertions of “right” and “good” serve. I got to thinking about it today by a passing comment made by a composer for the Kronos quartet today on Weekend Edition. He notes that through music we can become better people (major paraphrase, humor me), which I find to bear very strong similarities with the Greek worldview. Based on the text I’ve become acquainted with, there seems to be a perspective that perceived beauty can be associated with virtue because of its adherence to more cosmologically derived proportions, orders, and other associations. And I think it all comes down to sources of values, be they externally inherited or good for the individual based on experience and learning. Not only do I think that this process of internalization is a part of socialization, i.e. taking as true that which society believes to be good, I am also beginning to see more and more the process by which the individual values him or herself. And that’s some deep shit, and a major part of why this project remains so personal to me. All the other writing I’ve done on this subject aside, one can’t help but tend toward a little introspection on the matter of how one values him or herself via societal beliefs on what makes a good person. In the end, I think this is something I’ll continue to explore, but with some boundaries drawn. Whereas we can very readily see what values are admired and thought to be good in a particular society, the sources are a little tougher (unless they’re deliberately constructed by certain societal transmitters for a particular purpose), and even more difficult to understand by asking “why?” My intent here is to explore why we order or compel at all, without relying on those terminological copouts of “human nature” or “power.” I think enough thinkers and writers and artists will appear in my future study that I will have ample opportunity to continue exploring these questions, however evasive and often speculative the answers may be. More adventures.

Next time, Plato’s Republic, the theory of ideas and the co-optation of Pythagorean mathematical and musical concepts into mainstream discourse. Believe it or not, all this will be unbelievably easier now that I’ve done this rhetoric jazz. I’m glad I took the time. I’ve included some text from Gorgias, Isocrates, and another famed Athenian orator, Demosthenes, on the list for good measure, and updated my additional source list to include Walker and Snell’s books. And boy howdy, am I ready to crack out Aristotle and Hellenistic Greece and get on to Rome and the early Christian church. I need a change. Soon…Thanks a bunch to Jeffrey Walker for his great book.